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Introduction
In 2009-2010, the number and pace of attempted terrorist attacks against the
United States surpassed any year since 9/11.1 Three transnational terrorist groups
launched nearly successful attacks against the U.S.: (1) a plot against the New York City
subway system; (2) an attempt to blow up a Detroit-bound plane on Christmas Day; and
(3) an attempt to detonate an improvised explosive device inside a vehicle parked in
Times Square. In addition to these three incidents, there were also two successful
“homegrown” terrorist attacks executed by individual U.S. citizens, Major Nidal Hassan
and Carlos Bledsoe.
These events demonstrate the enduring capacity of terrorists to attack the United
States despite America’s extensive, well-funded security apparatus. Former U.S.
Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, identifies two objectives for domestic
security policy: first, to “manage rather than eliminate risks;” and second, to “engage in
preparedness planning so that when disasters do happen, we can respond in a manner that
minimizes the consequences.”2 When these two objectives are considered in light of the
continuing barrage of terrorist plots and attacks against the United States, a question
becomes obvious: Is the United States homeland security strategy effective?
This seemingly simple question is actually quite complex. The only way to even
consider it is to first define an “effective” strategy. Effective does not mean perfect. It is
impossible to detect and prevent every conceivable terrorist attack, and even if it were
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possible, it would be inefficient and unsustainable to do so. Rather, an effective antiterrorism strategy is essentially a pragmatic risk-cost-benefit analysis, whereby homeland
security funds are allocated based on threat-specific cost-benefit analyses done in relation
to actual risk. To be effective, anti-terrorism efforts must reflect realizable risk to U.S.
homeland security—as opposed to politicized, exaggerated derivatives of risk often
propagated by politicians and media.
Once an effective strategy is defined as action (cost) in proportion to actual risk
and security benefit, it is then helpful to divide the primary question—is the U.S.
homeland security strategy effective? — into three subsidiary questions. First, what are
the current threats, including actors, modes of terrorism, and potential targets, to U.S.
homeland security? Second, how does the United States address each of these threats,
both in terms of programs and expenditures? And, third, taking into account actual risk,
are the costs (meaning monetary expenditures, as well as, negative social and economic
externalities from security measures) and the corresponding benefits (meaning gains in
U.S. homeland security resulting from specific anti-terrorism programs) in equilibrium?
Reaching this equilibrium point between risk, cost, and benefit is both a necessary and a
sufficient condition for an effective U.S. homeland security strategy to mitigate risk and
prepare the nation for potential disasters.

3

Chapter One: Risk
Risk, for the purpose of this paper, is defined as “the desire to gauge the
likelihood of something being a hazard, and to project the possible outcomes should they
occur, so that the costs and benefits of mitigating, risk-reducing measures can be
assessed.”3 To be clear, hazards are anything that endangers society as a whole, and are
typically broken up into two groups: naturally occurring and man-made. Hazards
associated with terrorism are man-made, thus this paper will consider only man-made
hazards. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses a definition of risk that is
comprised of three components: threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences;4 and for this
reason, the threat analysis below will address these three components of risk. This
section will not detail the existing programs that address each threat, as the next section
does, but merely considers the threat itself since “the first step in preventing or mitigating
the risk of disaster is to know and understand the dangers we face.”5
To begin with, Chapter One outlines the terrorist groups posing the greatest risk
to U.S. homeland security. It then describes the various weapons technologies that may
be used in a future attack. In addition, this chapter also provides an overview of other
vulnerabilities to U.S. security, including cyber infrastructure, cargo and human
transportation systems, and the U.S. energy system. Finally, this chapter contextualizes
the current terrorist threat by considering trends in terrorist attacks over time.
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Terrorist Groups
Historically, terrorist groups fit into at least one of the following ideological
categories: religious, nationalist/separatist, left and/or revolutionary, right and/or
reactionary, anti-globalizationist, and extreme environmentalist. In the United States, the
popular narrative to conceptualize terrorism and anti-U.S. terrorist activity frames
terrorism as predominately, if not exclusively, religious. There are, however, timely
examples of each of the other ideological categories as well. For example, the Palestinian
Liberation Front (PLO) and the Basque group, Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), are
nationalist/separatist organizations; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
(FARC) is a left/revolutionary group; the Self Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC) is a
right/reactionary organization; the Mexican Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionaries del Pueblo
(FARP) is motivated by an anti-globalization ideology; and the Earth First and Earth
Liberation Front organizations are environmental extremist.6
As evidenced by this litany of terrorist groups with disparate motivations and
ideologies, it is more useful to consider the threat posed by various terrorist organizations
on a group-by group basis than to consider the threat of specific ideologies (e.g. religious
extremism), as is often done by policy analysts. To be clear, categorizing terrorist groups
by ideological motivations may be more helpful than considering individual groups for a
predictive analysis of the future of terrorism. For that sort of forward looking analysis the
focus is preventing terrorism, unlike this paper, which functions as a snap shot of existing
terrorist threats. For this reason, the following analysis examines individual terrorist
groups posing a significant, realizable threat to U.S. homeland security.
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Al Qaeda (AQ)
Michael Chertoff calls al Qaeda (AQ) the “most potent representative”7 of
extremist ideology today, while Vice-Admiral J. Michael McConnell, former U.S.
Director of Intelligence, describes AQ as “the pre-eminent threat against the United
States, both here and abroad.”8 AQ creates tremendous risk for U.S. homeland security
because of the organization’s extreme anti-American ideology, its willingness and ability
to use a variety of weapons technologies, and because of the geographically dispersed
network of its operations and affiliates that open new theatres of conflict in at least
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Iraq.
The threat of AQ attacks continues to evolve as the network’s structure responds
to counterterrorism efforts, specifically those in Afghanistan. Before 9/11, AQ had a
stable base of operations in Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, allowing the
organization to assume a formal internal hierarchy and to create permanent installations
and training camps.9 In fact, one RAND Corporation study attributes AQ’s successful
attacks on 9/11, as well as their 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, to the stability
afforded by a secure base of operations, internal hierarchy, and permanent installations.10
AQ’s organizational stability was compromised when the United States launched
Operation Enduring Freedom, a military assault against the Taliban regime in
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Afghanistan, shortly after 9/11.11 Operation Enduring Freedom scattered core AQ
leadership to various locations in the Middle East, thereby decentralizing AQ planning
and training efforts.
AQ organizational hierarchy has also been dramatically changed because key
members have been captured or killed by U.S. and coalition forces. Examples of senior
AQ leadership who have been eliminated or detained include: 9/11 coordinator, Ramzi
bin al-Shibi; operational planners, Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubayduh, and Khaled Sheikh
Mohammad; a senior leader of AQ on the Arabian Peninsula and organizer of the 2000
attack on the USS Cole, Adb al-Rahim al-Nashirih; AQ’s foremost connection to
Southeast Asian militant groups and the architect of the 2002 Bali attacks in Indonesia,
Riduan Isamuddin; a major factor in the 1998 embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania,
Ahmed Khalfan Ghalani; AQ’s third most senior leader, as of 2005, and operational
coordinator for Pakistan, Abu Faraj al-Libbi; and an important leader in disseminating
AQ jihadist communications worldwide, Haitham al-Yemeni. 12
AQ has also suffered major financial losses, totaling at least $136 million, in
frozen or seized assets.13 Additionally, a campaign to disable AQ’s international
fundraising efforts has “forced AQ to progressively adapt its jihadist ‘business model’
and switch to more secure, but less lucrative localized collection methods.”14 The loss of
existing assets, coupled with an encumbered ability to collect international resources,
weakens AQ’s ability to execute large-scale terrorist attacks.
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Another result of U.S. and coalition involvement in Afghanistan after 9/11 is the
decentralization of AQ’s institutional composition; “The loss of a secure haven in
Afghanistan and the loss of key human capital resources have stripped the group of the
vital command, logistical, and functional assets needed to operate in a vertically
organized manner.”15 Since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, AQ has been forced to
transition from centrally organized attacks executed by the group’s core membership, to a
more horizontal structure in which attacks are executed by geographically dispersed
affiliates or individuals. This new structure, often referred to as a “movement of
movements,” is still motivated by a monolithic message of international jihad, but is now
“nebulous, segmented, and polycentric in character.”16
The nature of future AQ attacks will be markedly different as a result of the
organization’s structural and economic setbacks. Specifically, the RAND Corporation
predicts four trends relating to future AQ attacks. First, AQ will shift from hard (meaning
well-protected) targets to soft targets. Previous AQ attacks, like those on 9/11, have
focused on hard targets to maximize the psychological impact of the attack and to
demonstrate AQ strength as both a coercive and recruiting tactic. The United States took
extensive measures after 9/11 to harden critical infrastructure deemed most vulnerable to
terrorist attack; unfortunately, when targets are hardened, threat displacement occurs, and
soft targets (meaning largely unprotected and publicly accessible venues) are left
vulnerable. Soft targets are attractive because they are often densely populated, and thus
an attack would likely yield mass causalities. The second trend identified by RAND, is

15

Chalk, Peter, et al. Trends in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act. RAND Corporation. Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy. 3 Mar. 2011.
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG393.pdf>
16
Ibid.

8

that AQ will increasingly pursue economic attacks, regardless of the ability for such
attacks to produce mass causalities. Economic attacks target major finical institutions
(such as the World Trade Center), disrupt major supply chains (such as an attack against
a U.S. sea port), expose risk and thus result in a massive reaction (such as a commercial
airline strike resulting in new security regulations).
The third predicted AQ trend is a continued reliance on suicide attackers.
Importantly, as domestic (homegrown) terrorism increases, the potential for suicide
missions in the United States grows as single-actor operatives proliferate. Finally, the
fourth anticipated trend is that AQ will continue to pursue chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Without question, AQ has shown interest in
acquiring or building CBRN weapons. Though there is general consensus that AQ does
not have nuclear weapons technologies, it is uncertain whether the organization has the
ability to produce radiological, biological and chemical weapons, or the degree of
sophistication to which such weapons can be produced. It is likely that the group has
some ability to produce radiological, biological and chemical weapons, and thus, it is not
unreasonable to assume that future AQ attacks will incorporate those weapons.
Aside from predictions of potential AQ attack trends, it is necessary to mention
the threat posed by the group’s ability to proliferate recruiting materials using a variety of
media. AQ propaganda has already influenced the radicalization of extremists at home
and abroad. For example, the 2009 Fort Hood shooter, Major Nidal Hassan,
communicated with Anwar al-Awlaki, a former Imam and current AQ leader, whose use
of new media technology to propagate AQ ideology worldwide has been linked to
numerous attacks against the U.S. in recent years. Propaganda does more than recruit

9

sympathizers to the AQ cause; it is a force multiplier in that it encourages “like-minded
extremists to conduct smaller-scale independent attacks that are inspired, but not
overseen or directed, by the group.”17 The advent of new media recruiting allows wouldbe terrorists to connect with AQ without traveling to the Middle East, which makes
detection more reliant on cybersecurity. In sum, threats from AQ to U.S. homeland
security emanate from that organization’s propaganda, and originate from both within
and outside the United States. These threats could take the form of catastrophic terrorism,
but will more likely involve small-scale attacks on soft targets or economically important
nodes.

AQ Affiliates and Allies
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Since 2009, AQAP has emerged as one of the world’s most lethal terrorist
networks, with a demonstrated and resilient ability to recruit and train operatives, plan
attacks, and facilitate the movement of terrorists from its home base in Yemen. AQAP’s
targets are international in scope. For example, in 2009 AQAP attempted to assassinate
Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, and also attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound plane
on Christmas Day. Importantly, Anwar al-Awlaki, mentioned above as a key
communicator for AQ, is a member of AQAP and a dual Yemeni-American citizen. AlAwlaki influenced Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the young man who attempted to blow
up the plane, and has also been linked to numerous other terrorist attacks as a spiritual
17
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leader and liaison between AQAP and individual recruits. AQAP continues to circumvent
anti-terrorist efforts and will remain a prevalent threat to U.S. Homeland security.

Al Qaeda Operatives in Somalia and Al-Shabaab
There are numerous AQ operatives, as well as the Somalia-based terrorist and
insurgent group, al-Shabaab, located in East Africa. Al-Shabaab was responsible for the
July 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda that killed 76 people. The group is also
believed to be responsible for the 2008 suicide attacks against the United Nations and
local government targets in northern Somalia. Al-Shabaab publicly supports AQ and
Osama bin Laden, and shares aspects of AQ ideology; but al-Shabaab ideology is also
Somali-nationalist. Al-Shabaab operates in collaboration with a small number of AQ
operatives in East Africa to facilitate a terrorist training program created by al-Shabaab
and the recently deceased AQ operative, Saleh Nabhan.18 This camp attracts violent
extremists from all over the world, including recruits from the United States—since 2006,
at least twenty U.S. citizens have traveled to Somalia to fight and train with al-Shabaab.19
When testifying before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Committee in September 2010, Michael Leiter, the director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, said “Within the last two months, four U.S. citizens of nonSomali descent were arrested trying to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab.”20 In
addition, Leiter noted that U.S. citizen, Omar Hammami, traveled to Somalia in 2006 and
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is now one of al-Shabaab's senior leaders.21 Leiter also pointed out that, when
interviewed by the New York Times, Hammami called the U.S. a legitimate target for
future al-Shabaab attacks. Though not as grave a threat as AQ and AQAP, al-Shabaab
remains a threat to U.S. homeland security.

Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM is a terrorist group located in North and West Africa. The group has
historically focused on kidnapping and small-arms attacks. Recently, however, AQIM
has demonstrated the ability and intention to progress to more lethal attacks. In July,
2010, AQIM executed a French hostage and earlier that year, the group launched its first
suicide bombing attack in Niger. The efforts of Algerian authorities have disrupted and
deterred AQIM plots for mass-causality attacks, but the group’s public support of
Nigerian extremists and its ongoing plans to attack France demonstrate AQIM
commitment to violence. Though not currently directed at the United States, AQIM is
still a threat to U.S. citizens abroad and to U.S. interests in North and West Africa.

Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI)
AQI has continued to execute attacks within Iraq, despite counterterrorism efforts
that resulted in the deaths of AQI’s most senior leadership, including Abu Ayyub alMasri, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, Abu Khalaf, and Abu Abd al Rahman.22 U.S. officials
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describe AQI as “a numerically small but operationally major component of the Sunni
Arab-led insurgency that frustrated U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq.”23 After the U.S. “troop
surge” in 2007, AQI was displaced from operational centers in Iraq, particularly in
Baghdad and in Anbar Province.24 U.S. security experts warn that AQI is “weakened
almost to the point of outright defeat in Iraq,” but “remains lethal and has the potential to
revive.”25 Because of violent incidents occurring in northern-central Iraq resembling
typical AQI attacks, U.S. and coalition forces continue to conduct offensive measures
against AQI leadership and strongholds to further weaken the group.26 Experts believe
that a significant number of AQI members are relocating to Pakistan to join AQ affiliates
there.27 Thus, AQI still poses a threat to U.S. interests.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
TTP is an AQ ally in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in
Northwest Pakistan. Formed in 2007, TTP is an alliance of militant groups seeking to
impose their version of shari’a law in Pakistan and to rid Afghanistan of coalition troops.
Though distinct, TTP maintains “close ties to senior al-Qa’ida leaders, providing critical
support to al-Qa’ida in the FATA and sharing some of the same global violent extremist
goals.”28 Since 2008, TTP has repeatedly threatened to attack the United States. In fact,
the failed 2010 Times Square bombing was executed by U.S. citizen, Faisal Shahzad,
23
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who received training and financial support from TTP. In addition to this attack, TTP is
also responsible for the April 2010 attacks against the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar,
Pakistan, and for the suicide bombing in Khowst, Afghanistan, that killed seven
Americans.

Haqqani Network and Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI)
Both Haqqani Network and HUJI are based in Pakistan, have close ties to AQ,
and are intent upon attacking U.S. targets and persons in the region. Though these groups
have yet to execute an attack in the West, they have the capabilities to do so. The
Haqqani Network claimed responsibility for the 2008 attack against a hotel in Kabul that
killed six, and has organized and participated in attacks in Afghanistan against U.S. and
coalition troops.29 In 2009, HUJI attacked Pakistani intelligence and police facilities in
Lahore, Pakistan, killing 23 people.30 Then, in 2007, the group attacked a mosque in
Hyderabad, India, killing 16 people.31 The lethality of these attacks demonstrates the
groups’ potential to inflict mass-causalities in the future, perhaps even in the West or
against Western targets abroad.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)
LT is a Sunni extremist group based in Pakistan which poses a significant threat
to U.S. interests in South Asia. LT attacks in Kashmir and India “have had a destabilizing
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effect on the region,” by escalating tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.32 The
most significant LT attack occurred in 2008 when the group launched eight simultaneous
attacks in Mumbai, India focusing on civilian-centric targets including a hotel, a theatre, a
tourist attraction, a college, and a café, that resulted in mass causalities and has become
the paradigm of soft-target assaults. LT continues to plan attacks that could harm U.S.
interests or citizens and to support AQ and the Taliban in Afghanistan in an effort to
ouster U.S. and Coalition troops from that region.

Hezbollah
Hezbollah has operated continuously for more than a quarter of a century, during
which time, the organization has developed capabilities “about which AQ can only
dream, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives,
uniformly well-trained operatives, an exceptionally well-disciplined military force of
30,000 fighters, and extraordinary political influence.”33 Hezbollah is both an army and a
political party, and has gained control in Lebanon. Though Hezbollah has never attacked
the United States, it is developing a presence in South America, particularly in the triborder area between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.34 In 1992, Hezbollah claimed
responsibility for bombing the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, an attack that killed 29
people. Then in 1994, Hezbollah bombed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires,
killing 85 people. Importantly, Hezbollah’s patron is Iran, which is currently cultivating a
32
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strategic partnership with Venezuela. With Iran as its benefactor, many security experts
warn that Hezbollah “would likely consider attacks on U.S. interests, to include the
homeland, if it perceived a direct threat from the United States to itself or to Iran.”35

“Homegrown” Terrorism
It would be disingenuous to discuss the threat of terrorism to U.S. homeland
security without addressing the issue of domestic, or “homegrown,” terrorism. In the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, before the threat of terrorism had been fully conceptualized,
rhetorical distinctions of “us,” meaning Americans, versus “them,” meaning terrorist,
defined the U.S. narrative on terrorism. “Othering” the enemy creates a false distinction.
As the terrorist events of 2009-10 convey, there is no impermeable line differentiating
U.S. citizens from terrorists. Since 2009, “at least 63 American citizens have been
charged or convicted of terrorism or related crimes.”36 In her written testimony submitted
to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Janet
Napolitano, secretary of DHS, defined “homegrown” terrorists as: “terrorist operatives
who are U.S. persons, and who were radicalized in the United States and learned terrorist
tactics either here or in training camps in places such as the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas of Pakistan.”37 Terrorist groups recruit U.S. citizens because of their
knowledge of Western culture, American security practices, and the English language—
skills that assist terrorist organizations in planning and executing successful attacks.
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Though individuals radicalize for various reasons, the recent “spike” in
homegrown terrorism is at least partially attributable to AQ propaganda with “a U.S.specific narrative that motivates individuals to violence.”38 This narrative is disseminated
over the Internet on English-language websites, and is best described as “a blend of [alQaeda] inspiration, perceived victimization, and glorification of past plotting.”39 Though
it is unclear whether the recent increase in homegrown terrorist activity is truly a new
development, as opposed to the mobilization of previously radicalized citizens, it is clear
that AQ efforts to recruit U.S. citizens has intensified.
After the Fort Hood shootings in 2009, AQ public messages began advocating
lone-operative attacks by U.S. citizens, while simultaneously deploring U.S. outreach to
Muslim communities. AQAP also released Inspire magazine, an English-language online
magazine that incorporates tips for “bomb-making, traveling overseas, email encryption,
and a list of individuals to assassinate.”40 Online magazines, YouTube videos, chat
rooms, and Websites provide English-speakers with access to terrorist networks. The
result: an obvious increase in the mobilization of U.S. nationals who have been
radicalized within the United States, and are intent on attacking America.

Methods of Terrorism
The calculus of risk assessment must include not only actors, but also
methodologies, or, in other words, the means terrorists have to achieve their desired ends.
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Weapons and modes of terrorism have various gradations of lethality and availability.
Thus, terrorists’ power, and the risk they create for the United States, is defined by their
ability to deploy various weapons. The following analysis considers potential modes of
terrorism to assess American vulnerability within the context of each method of potential
attack.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
Historically, IEDs have been the most often used method of terrorism. This is
because IEDs are easy to construct from ubiquitously sold, inexpensive materials. IED
attacks are also popular with terror groups because they involve minimum risk; it is
difficult to detect a bomb maker who buys seemingly innocuous supplies sold
commercially on the open market. Additionally, most terrorists are able to install remote
detonation capability on a bomb, allowing them to control both the time and distance
from the explosion, thus facilitating escape.
Bombs are also attractive because there are detailed, accurate instructions on how
to make IEDs available on various public websites and in books. For example,
Amazon.com currently sells at least two books known to have precise instructions on
bomb making: The Anarchists Cookbook and Home Workshop Explosives. Because of the
strategic advantages of IEDs— with respect to cost, detection, and escape— and the
widespread availability of both materials and instructions to make explosive devices, the
U.S. will continue to face IED attacks abroad and likely at home as well.
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Suicide Bombings
The first major suicide bombing by a non-state actor occurred in Beirut in 1981,
at the hands of the Iranian-backed Shia group, Al-Dawa. The attack killed 27 and
wounded 100—a level of lethality that inspired other terrorist groups to incorporate
suicide strikes. This method of terrorism is appealing because, like IEDs generally,
suicide terrorism is inexpensive. However, unlike planted IEDs, suicide terrorism is more
precise—the terrorist can infiltrate the target and detonate the IED at any moment.
Additionally, suicide terrorism guarantees media coverage, both because of the
psychological damage of suicide attacks, and also because such attacks usually produce a
spectacle in the form of mass confusion, disruption, and causalities. After interviewing
250 militant Palestinians, Nasra Hassan wrote of suicide terrorism: “Apart from a willing
young man, all that is needed are such items as nails, gunpowder, a battery, a light
switch, a short cable, mercury (readily available from thermometers), acetone, and the
cost of tailoring a belt wide enough to hold six or eight pockets of explosives. The most
expensive item is transportation to a distant Israeli town. The total cost of a typical
[suicide] operation is about a hundred dollars.”41
Suicide terrorists also do not have to make escape plans or fear the loss of group
secrets if operatives are arrested. This mode of terrorism kills “about four times as many
people on average than any other type of terrorism.”42 Furthermore, suicide terrorists can
operate alone, meaning that individual, “lone-wolf,” operatives can undertake a suicide
mission remotely, such as in America.
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Assassinations
Assassinating a prominent public figure is an attractive option for terrorists
because the death of an important person is psychologically disturbing to the public,
likely to draw major media coverage, and will result in political, religious or other
disarray as the targeted public official will need to be replaced. For these reasons, an
assassination can be a very effective method of terrorism despite the fact that only one
person is typically killed. To execute a successful assassination, terrorists often use IEDs
because, as noted earlier, bombings are more likely to allow terrorists to escape detection
than the use of handguns or other weaponry. Nevertheless, terrorists have used firearms
in the past to assassinate public figures from close range. For example, in 2002, two
assassins killed Marco Biagi, an Italian government consulate, with a handgun as Biagi
entered his home. Assassinations are a common way to harm a foreign nation without
having to infiltrate that nation. Thus, U.S. efforts to bolster homeland security may have
little effect on the ability of terrorists to assassinate prominent U.S. officials abroad.

Missile Attacks
Missile launchers are expensive and easily detectable, and thus risky for terrorist
organizations to use. The cumbersome nature of the weapon makes an expedient
departure from the attack difficult, even under the cover of darkness. With missile
launchers, “Unless terrorists operate in a friendly environment, operate within failed or
failing states, or have secured getaway routes, there’s always the risk of being caught.”43
Thus, terrorists typically do not use this technology, with the single exception of
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Hezbollah. That group has been known to launch missiles into Israel with few, if any,
repercussions.

Aviation attacks, hijackings
Hijackings, though an effective means of terrorism when successful, are
contingent upon inept security measures in airports and on the actual plane. For this
reason, hijackings have decreased in frequency over time. After 9/11, commercial
aviation implemented a number of security measures to deter potential hijackers. For
example, the U.S. Transpiration Security Administration (TSA) has implemented a
“layered” security approach at U.S. airports which includes the following programs:
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response, Travel Document Checker, Behavior
Detection Officers, The Secure Flight Program, Federal Air Marshalls, Federal Flight
Deck Officers, Employee Screening, and Checkpoint Screening Technology. 44 Each of
these programs will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Two.
There are, however, two primary concerns creating risk for commercial aviation
hijackings. First, there are no internationally enforced aviation security guidelines,
resulting in a fragmented security system with unquestionable disparities between the
many international airports. In an article, “The Terrorist Threat to Inbound U.S.
Passenger Flights: Inadequate Government Response,” Anthony Fainberg notes that:
“Standard risk assessment and risk mitigation formalism indicate that,
given equivalent consequences, one should generally try to reduce
vulnerabilities where threats are higher. The apparent inaction of the TSA
in regard to flights originating overseas appears to violate this principle.
Threats to civil aviation are most likely greater overseas than they are in
44
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the United States, but the vulnerabilities of U.S.-bound overseas flights to
terrorist attacks are greater than threats to domestic flights, not less. This is
because equivalent technical security measures applied to civil aviation in
the United States are not required for the overseas, inbound flights.”45
Though the United States’ security officials have often commented on the need for
international security regulation standards, there has not been any significant effort to
implement standardization. U.S. policymakers have been reluctant to lobby the
international community for security regulations because of concerns about violating the
sovereignty of other nations.
The second risk-multiplier for commercial aviation hijacking is the general
aversion to new security technologies demonstrated by the American public. For
example, in 2010 TSA introduced “advanced imaging technology,” also known as fullbody scanners, in 78 airports nation-wide (as of December 23, 2010).46 After some 486 of
these devices were implemented, there was massive backlash from the general public and
the media over the invasiveness of the new scanners.47 Opponents of the technology are
concerned that the images produced by the machines, which show an outline of the
passenger’s naked body, invade personal privacy, despite the fact that these images blur
the passenger’s face. Additionally, the technicians operating these machines are isolated
in a separate room to ensure that there is no interaction between the image-viewers and
passengers.
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Nonetheless, the intense resistance to these machines has jeopardized the
incorporation of the 300 additional machines planned for 2011.48 This situation
demonstrates the tension between civil liberties and security that precludes the
implementation of the most effective security measures. Without universal standards for
aviation security, and in light of the constraints imposed by the American public,
commercial aviation will likely remain vulnerable to terrorist attack.

Kidnappings
Kidnappings are complicated operations requiring extensive planning, quickthinking during the actual seizure, a network of operatives to support the operation while
the victim is being detained, and a secure base of operation from which the perpetrators
can communicate demands. The 1991 kidnapping and subsequent murder of CIA station
chief, William Buckley, and Marine Colonel William Higgins by Lebanese terrorists is a
paradigm of this type of terrorism. AQ kidnappings are characteristically not negotiating
situations; victims tend to be murdered as an overt warning to target nations. In the past,
such murders have been accompanied by the release of graphic video messages including
footage of the brutal murders. A now infamous instance of this type of attack occurred in
2002, when Wall Street Journal reporter, Daniel Pearl, was beheaded in Pakistan. As in
the Pearl case, kidnappings can generate massive media coverage and produce graphic
images that become iconic symbols of the terrorists’ power.
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Mass Disruption
The most common threat of mass disruption is an attack against U.S. energy
systems or critical infrastructure, particularly energy grids and gas pipelines. The
potential consequences of this type of attack were realized on August 14th, 2003, when an
accidental breakdown of the electric power supply structure in part of the Midwest,
Northeast, and in Canada affected 50 million people.49 Because energy systems in the
United States are mostly privatized, security is fragmented even within industries. The
major vulnerabilities of the energy sector are the lack of industry standards to protect
against attacks, especially cyber attacks, and the unnecessary risk created by the close
proximity of certain critical infrastructure, particularly petroleum pipelines.
With respect to the lack of industry standards, there is growing concern that
certain potentially lethal industries, such as chemical research facilities and
pharmaceutical laboratories, do not have sufficient security measures both within the
facility and pertaining to personnel hiring practices. As for the close proximity of critical
infrastructure, the vulnerability of the Gulf Coast region of the United States is apparent
given the volume of oil pipeline that runs through that area. Additionally, other critical
infrastructure, such as nuclear facilities and energy grids, are easily located and thus
vulnerable to attack. An attack against the U.S. energy sector has not yet occurred
because such an attack is complicated, requiring in depth understanding of the U.S. oil,
natural gas, and electric supply chains as well as the computer systems controlling those
sectors. However, Kevin King defines the growing inadequacies in the U.S. energy
security policy in his essay, “Redefining U.S. Energy Security in the Twenty-First
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Century.” According to King, America “is in a state of deepening energy insecurity,” and
“stability in the vital regions that serve the international petroleum and natural gas
markets will not be enough, even if this is possible to achieve.”50 In short, the U.S.
energy sector is vulnerable, yet has not been attacked, not because of security policy, but
because an attack against it would require a high degree of sophistication and planning by
a capable terrorist organization.

Mass Destruction
The threat of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attack is the
foremost concern in counterterrorism policy. Galvanizing concerns relating to CBRN
attacks, is the fact that, after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, weapons of mass
destruction may have been leaked to terrorist groups or belligerent nations. Even those
who contend that the dispersal of loose CBRN weapons is unlikely admit that Soviet
expertise on the creation and maintenance of such weapons has surely reached belligerent
nations, if not terrorist groups. The term “CBRN” encompasses a wide variety of
weaponry and technologies that warrant individual discussion since there is considerable
variation within this category with respect to risk.
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Chemical
The risk of chemical attack is really concentrated on three potential agents:
Mustard Gas, Sarin, and VX.51 Mustard Gas can be either a gas or a liquid which
sometimes smells like conventional mustard—hence the name. The agent works by
attacking the skin causing severe blisters. It is most lethal when inhaled; in such
instances, the agent causes lung and organ damage, and may even damage DNA. As a
result of inhalation, victims can develop cancer, and if pregnant, birth defects. The threat
of a Mustard Gas attack is not as significant as the threat of chemical terrorism using
other, more lethal chemical weapons, especially because “there is no known instance of
terrorists using Mustard Gas as a weapon.”52
Sarin, in either its liquid or gas form, is much more deadly than most other
chemical agents. Sarin can be absorbed through the skin or inhaled, and will kill victims
within minutes of initial contact. Sarin works by attacking the victim’s nervous system,
muscles and organs. The Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, produced Sarin in the 1990s and
used it in an attack on the Tokyo subway system that killed a dozen people and injured
over a thousand riders.53
VX is the most lethal nerve gas ever created. This agent is absorbed through the
skin and attacks the nervous system, killing victims shortly after contact. This agent is
very difficult to produce, but Aum Shinrikyo produced traces of VX as early as the
1990s.54 The cult attempted to use the agent in several assassinations, one of which was
successful. Though the Aum Shinrikyo is cult by far the most advanced terrorist group in
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terms of developing and using chemical agents in attacks, it is possible that chemical
weapons may be developed by other terrorist groups in the future and used against the
United States.

Biological
In the weeks following the 9/11 terror attacks, several letters containing spores of
a lethal bacteria were mailed to members of the media and politicians. The perpetrator
was never identified. As demonstrated by these attacks, biological weapons are both a
dangerous and realizable threat to the United States. There are four biological threats to
consider: anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin, and ricin.55
Anthrax can infiltrate the body via inhalation, ingestion, and even through skin
abrasions. If anthrax enters the lungs, most victims die if not treated immediately because
the anthrax spores will lodge deep in the lungs. If anthrax is absorbed through the skin or
ingested, the spores are less lethal. To produce anthrax, a terrorist must grow the bacteria,
free-dry (lyophilization) it, mill it to a 1-to-5-micron particles ratio, and then treat it with
an antistatic coating.56 When properly produced, anthrax is colorless, odorless, and
capable of floating freely, like a gas. If an attack is not detected, the first symptoms of
infection are flu-like and start 36-48 hours after contact. Even with antibiotic treatment,
the prognosis for those showing symptoms is very poor. There are also concerns that,
even if an attack is detected, there may still be mass casualties since “the U.S. Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS) of key medicines and supplies is capable of flying prophylactic
and treatment doses to any major city within twelve hours, but distribution to millions of
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residents in less than two days is extremely unlikely.”57 There is also concern that, in the
event of a terrorist attack, there would not be enough antibiotic treatments available on
short notice, and given that the window of time to counteract the biological agents is less
than two days, any shortage in treatments would likely be fatal.
The smallpox virus is the second biological threat to U.S. homeland security.
Although the virus was declared eradicated more than thirty years ago, the United States
and Russia are known to have stores of the smallpox virus.58 Before eradication, the virus
spread insatiably, killing millions of people every year.59 Regardless of its lethality,
terrorist groups are not likely to use the smallpox virus in an attack because it is so
contagious; however, there is still a small possibility that “a financially strong terrorist
organization with scientists in its ranks could perhaps acquire smallpox through
unemployed experts in the field who once worked in the Soviet Union’s biological
weapons program.”60
Botulinum toxin, the third potential biological weapon to consider, is the most
poisonous biological agent known. It is estimated that, if properly dispersed in its most
concentrated form, botulinum toxin could kill a billion people.61 After exposure to the
toxin in potent concentrations, victims will experience muscle paralysis and die shortly
thereafter. The Aum Shinrikyo cult attempted to produce a biological weapon that
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incorporated both anthrax and botulinum toxin, however the weapon proved unsuccessful
in the 12 attacks in which the cult tried to use the weapon in Tokyo from 1990-1995.62
Finally, ricin is a protein toxin found in castor beans that is “two hundred times
more potent than cyanide” if inhaled, ingested, or injected.63 There is no known antidote
for this toxin; victims will die. The threat of ricin, although small, is real: in 2003, British
police found a small quantity of ricin in a building just outside of London. Seven Muslim
extremists were arrested in connection with the finding.64
In Afghanistan, coalition forces found small amounts of ricin and anthrax in
several AQ operation centers and, in 2003, with the arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,
U.S. officials discovered that AQ was planning to manufacture anthrax to be used against
the United States in a biological attack.65 Although AQ’s bioterrorist aspirations have not
yet materialized, there have been a number of biological attacks in the past, including: (1)
the 1995 sarin gas attack executed by Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subway; (2) Aum
Shinrikyo’s 1995 attempt to aerosolize anthrax in a Tokyo neighborhood; (3) the 2002
attempt to release cyanide on the London subway; (4) the 2003 attempt to use ricin on the
London subway; and (5) the 2004 AQ attempt to release a chemical agent in Amman.66
Clearly, biological terrorism is a realizable and potentially deadly threat to U.S.
homeland security.
The effectiveness of a biological attack is largely determined by three factors:
first, the specific agent used; second, the environment in which the agent is disseminated;
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and third, the delivery and dissemination process used in the attack.67 With respect to the
first factor, the selection, production and processing procedures for biological agents are
critically important to the effectiveness of any biological weapon. After the biological
agent is selected, and it is determined that the selected strain is an effective diseasecausing agent, then the biological agent is processed to become a biological weapon.68
The agent must be weaponized for easy dispersal in the air to reach the greatest number
of people possible. The wetness or dryness of the agent is paramount to the dispersal
process: “As a rule, it is difficult to produce highly weaponized dry bioagent but easy to
disperse such material, and easier to produce wet agent but difficult to aerosolize it for
widespread dispersal.”69
As for the second factor—the dispersal environment—environmental conditions
often govern the success or failure of a biological attack. With the exception of anthrax,
“sunlight can degrade the material, rain might literally dampen the impact, and high
winds or those blowing in the wrong direction can prevent infection of those targeted.”70
Finally, the third factor, the nature of the delivery and dissemination processes, is
important in general but especially for wet biological agents which require precise
equipment for large-scale aerosolization. Importantly, small-scale aerosolization is not
difficult. Even simple household items like a perfume bottle can aerosolize wet biological
agents. It is only when large-scale dissemination is attempted that mechanization
becomes complex.
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Agricultural terrorism is a subset within the subject of biological terrorism. To
date, there has never been an instance of agricultural terrorism directed against the United
States. However, one RAND Corporation study detailing biological terrorist threats
warns: “While several scenarios are possible, attacks against the agricultural sector could
well pose the most serious threat, given their ease of management and potential socioeconomic fallout (both of which fit well with the general evolutionary dynamic of al
Qaeda in the post 9/11 era.)”71 Small- and medium-size food processing and packing
plants are vulnerable to infiltration. Thousands of these plants exist in the U.S., most of
which have disparate internal quality control, insufficient biosurveillance, and largely
unscreened workforces.72 For example, many plants have no, or very few, exit and entry
controls. RAND notes: “This lack of concerted and uniform security has served to
increase the possibility of orchestrating a toxic/bacterial food-borne attack, which even in
a limited form could trigger widespread psychological angst and social panic.”73
Processed food is distributed from a plant within a few hours of production. Thus, in the
event of a terrorist attack, tainted food would disappear into food distribution channels
and not be readily apparent or recoverable.
Agricultural terrorism could also include an attack against the U.S. cattle industry.
Such an attack “would also fit well with al Qaeda’s general emphasis on delivering a
crippling blow to the American economy.”74 If a terrorist group weaponized foot-andmonth disease, for example, the result could be equivalent to a smallpox epidemic. The
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weaponization process for such a disease is not difficult or expensive. To introduce footand-mouth disease, a terrorist would simply have to inject a cow with a viral sample; the
disease is so contagious, and the American livestock industry so concentrated, that a
multi-focal outbreak would likely occur.75 The economic effects of an attack like this
would be catastrophic. According to the Department of Agriculture, an outbreak of footand-mouth disease within the American beef supply would cost the United States billions
of dollars in lost exports and potential trade sanctions and could disrupt the international
beef market for years.76

Radiological
Unlike bioterrorism which is considered a less significant threat to U.S. security
because of the complexity of creating and distributing bioweapons, radiological terrorism
using a “dirty bomb” is a far more significant threat. Dirty bombs are conventional
explosive devices containing radiological material; once the bomb explodes, the
radiological material is dispersed and will contaminate the surrounding area. The lethality
of dirty bombs depends on several factors, most notably: the potency of the radiological
material used, the weather conditions at the time of detonation, and the speed of
emergency responders.77
Constructing a radiological weapon is not significantly more complicated than
constructing a conventional bomb. The primary obstacle for any terrorist is acquiring the

75

CHALK, PETER. Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly The Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological
Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry. The Rand Corporation. 3 Mar. 2011.
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG135.pdf>.
76
Ibid.
77
Terrorism and Homeland Security: Thinking Strategically About Policy. Ed. Paul Viotti, Michael
Opheim, and Nicholas Bowen. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, 2008. Print.

32

radiological material. Obtaining this material, however, may not be as difficult as
policymakers would like: “there are a myriad of sources internal to the United States that
could be used for this purpose, ranging from radiation equipment employed in medical
facilities to U.S. research stations, commercial sites, and atomic waste storage tanks
located at prominent nuclear facilities found at military installations (something
particularly true of radiotherapy clinics), and at least some power plants have already
been locus of accidental atomic releases.”78 Radiological material could also be imported
from outside the U.S., as was the case in 2003 when an AQ operative, Adnan El
Shukrijumah, was discovered attempting to import radioactive components from a
research facility in Canada. Shukrijumah was planning to use the radioactive material in
an attack targeting the United Sates in 2004.79
Even if a radiological attack did not result in human causalities, the consequences
would still be severe. Depending on the quality of the device, the sophistication of the
plan, and the conditions at the detonation site, a very large area, encompassing tens of
thousands of square miles, could be contaminated beyond habitability and require
demolition.80 Ports and major cities are the most concerning potential targets of a
radiological attack. A recent RAND study considers the effects of the 2002 lockdown of
29 ports along the western seaboard of the United States as a substantive equivalent to the
ramifications of a potential radiological attack. In the 2002 incident, the port closures
resulted from a labor dispute between unions and management and lasted for almost two
weeks. As result, 200 ships carrying 300,000 containers were delayed, with the direct
78
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cost estimated to be $467 million.81 Comparisons, like the RAND study, estimating
potential losses from radiological attacks may seem far-fetched, but the threat of
radiological terrorism is not hypothetical. In 2003, U.S. officials arrested an American
citizen, with links to AQ, planning a domestic attack using a uranium-enriched
radiological device.

Nuclear
Atomic terrorism is nearly impossible because building a nuclear weapon requires
a sophisticated, fixed laboratory facility in which to produce the necessary fissile material
– namely, highly enriched uranium or plutonium. This facility would be conspicuous and
easily discovered by U.S. intelligence networks. Perhaps the difficulty of hiding
production facilities is what inspired both AQ and Aum Shinrikyo to try to buy highly
enriched plutonium from sources in Russia and other members of the former Soviet bloc
in their attempt to create atomic weapons.82 Even if a terrorist group were to acquire the
fissile material for a nuclear weapon, however, it would not be easy to store because
nuclear weapons require constant maintenance to be viable. As with producing enriched
uranium, storing nuclear weapons would be obvious. Nevertheless, it is more likely that a
nuclear weapons facility could be maintained covertly if its sole purpose were
maintenance, not production, of nuclear missiles.
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In addition to the scenario in which a terrorist group buys the fissile material to
produce a nuclear weapon, there are three other possibilities: first, that a terrorist
organization could buy Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons left over from the Soviet
Union on the black market; second, that a terrorist group could steal a nuclear weapon
from a storage facility; and third, that a terrorist organization could receive a nuclear
weapon from a failed or failing state with a nuclear arsenal but which is unwilling to
overtly attack the United States. There are several nations with nuclear arsenals and
strong, anti-U.S. leanings—North Korea has had the capability to build nuclear weapons
since 2004, and Iran either has the ability now, or will soon have the ability, to develop
nuclear weapons.83 There is an emerging black market for nuclear technologies,
materials and knowledge generally. In 2004, it became apparent that “the Pakistani
scientist, A.Q. Khan, probably provided information about gas-centrifuges used to
produce weapons grade uranium and nuclear bomb designs to North Korea, Iraq, Iran,
Libya, and Syria.”84 There is also growing concern among experts that Iran will become a
“clandestine source of fissile material for terrorists,” once its nuclear program is proven
credible.85 Though nuclear weapons are an unlikely threat, relative to radiological,
biological or chemical weapons (as will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3), they merit
consideration and prevention as the consequences for a nuclear attack are much more
devastating than any other possible attack.
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Cyberterrorism
In Homeland Security: Assessing the First Five Years, former Secretary of
Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, distinguishes the threat of cyberterrorism –
defined as “a large-scale cyber attack against shared information technology and cyber
infrastructure, including the Internet,” – as “one of the most complex and potentially
consequential” challenges of the 21st Century.86 Of particular concern are cyber attacks
against U.S. energy systems and cyber attacks coinciding with other terrorist attacks to
prevent expedient action by first-responders. U.S. intelligence indicates that at least
Russia and China have the technological capacity to disrupt American information
systems and to hack U.S. computer systems to collect intelligence and critical
information.87 Terrorist groups, including AQ and Hezbollah have expressed a desire to
launch cyber attacks against the United States. And, in recent years, these groups have
demonstrated an increasing sophistication and ability to pursue such cyber attacks. In
fact, there is an emerging illicit cyber capabilities and services economy for those with
the financial resources to participate.
The threat of cyberterrorism is by no means unfounded. In 2002, the FBI
discovered an unauthorized pattern of surveillance of the Silicon Valley computer
systems. In collaboration with experts from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories,
the FBI traced the initial pattern to broader trails of reconnaissance.88 In the FBI forensic
summary of the investigation, prepared for the U.S. Defense Department, it was revealed
that the investigation yielded evidence of “multiple castings of sites” across the U.S.,

86

Chertoff, Michael. Homeland Security: Assessing the First Five Years. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2009. Print.
87
Ibid.
88
Ibid.

36

routed through telecommunication switches in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan.
The infiltrators “studied telephone systems, electrical generation and transmission, water
storage and distribution, nuclear power plants and gas facilities.”89 A number of the
probes lead experts to conclude that there were plans for conventional attacks on the
United States which would use “a class of digital devices that allow remote control of
services such as fire dispatch and of equipment, such as pipelines.”90 Reason for concern
is exacerbated by the 2008 confiscation of AQ computer systems on which resided more
information about such remote control devices.
Because the Internet, information technology networks, and communications
infrastructure are not government-owned or operated, cybersecurity is unlike other threats
to U.S. homeland security. Cybersecurity is not exclusively the federal government’s
responsibility, and federal authorities “would not want to force a burdensome and
intrusive security regime on one of the most dynamic and reliable engines of the U.S.
economy.”91 However, cybersecurity cannot be a strictly private sector responsibility
either, as the benefits from, and the reliance on, cyber infrastructure are dispersed
throughout a myriad of other industries and society as a whole creating risk and
vulnerability for all users in the event of a cyber attack. Cybersecurity is also
complicated by the multiplicity of entry points, the lack of a central node or database, and
the fact that no one individual, corporation or industry operates all information
technology infrastructure. The threat of cyberterrorism is emerging and constantly
increasing in sophistication, scope and capable actors.
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Other Vulnerabilities
Transportation Systems
The U.S. transportation system is porous and difficult to defend because it
encompasses rail, road, air, and sea transport routes with a vast network of terminals, or
nodes. Since the transportation sector is inextricably linked to commerce and the nation’s
economic well-being, components of the transportation system are ideal targets for
terrorism. Specifically, the transportation sector “accounts for over 10 percent of U.S.
GDP and about 20 percent of a household’s expenditures, and employs over fourteen
million people.”92 Historically, attacks on the transportation system have been
conventional, usually involving IEDs. However, vulnerabilities within the transportation
sector are expanding with the incorporation of new technology, like telecommunications
systems. New computer systems are paramount to most forms of travel today. The
integration of new technology adds the risk of cyber attack to the already risk-laden field
of transportation security. Potential targets for cyber terrorists include: highway traffic
controls, train control centers, air traffic control systems, and seaports.
Another result of technological advances is that transportation networks have
become increasingly integrated and interdependent. Within an intermodal system,
connection nodes become more vulnerable to attack and also more important to the
viability of the system as a whole. If one node is debilitated, the repercussions may affect
multiple components of the transportation system, disrupting the entire system. Security
within the various modes of transportations, and at each node, is piecemeal—each unit
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has unique security regulations and procedures. This further complicates security in that
each mode of transportation, and perhaps individual nodes within sectors of the
transportation system, must coordinate to create a layered security approach to prevent
holes in the system. In this way, “intermodalism greatly complicates security
calculations, particularly when we continue to think of security purely within one mode at
a time.”93
After the 7/7 attacks in London, there has been international scrutiny of public
transportation security. Unfortunately, the volume of light rail, bus, subway, inter-city rail
and commuter rail ridership makes screening each passenger untenable. For example, in
the United States, over ten million trips are taken each day on metro and commuter
systems.94 To address the apparent vulnerabilities in public transportation systems the
Federal Transit Association conducted threat assessments for major transportation
systems; sent technical assistance teams to help individual transit agencies develop and
implement security programs; developed chemical detection systems; promoted training
and regional collaboration; created a public awareness program; and distributed security
guidelines to local agencies.95 The effectiveness of these measures has yet to be
established, but even if they are effective, transit authorities are still concerned by the
lack of funding to harden transit systems. There is a considerable funding disparity within
transportation systems; “in the first few years after 9/11, for example, the federal
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government allocated a mere $250 million to mass transit, compared to $15 billion for
commercial aviation.”96
In addition to subway attacks, port and maritime attacks are also of particular
concern for U.S. homeland security. To prevent an attack on a port, incoming cargo must
be screened soon after entering the port. Port authorities have been the most out-spoken
opponents of port screening because, they argue, aggressive security measures will slow
down shipping speeds, thus undermining U.S. trade advantages and domestic and
international commerce. Currently, cargo is driven through screeners after being
unloaded onto land transportation. This screening process prevents an attack targeting the
interior, but if terrorists plan to attack the port itself, such screening measures accomplish
nothing. Even when screening technology detects suspicious devices or substances, port
personnel are not trained to determine which substances constitute potentially lethal
materials, or what quantities of those substances are acceptable.
Finally, U.S. homeland security is threatened by the disparity between port
screening practices in the United States and in foreign countries. Take, for example, one
GAO study which found that some “35% of potentially dangerous containers were not
screened in foreign ports due to diplomatic considerations and inadequate staffing.”97
Thus, the lack of international screening standards for foreign cargo into the United
States, in conjunction with inadequate domestic screening measures and training
standards, make U.S. ports lucrative targets for terrorism.
Air cargo is also a potential target for terrorist attacks, implicating both
commercial and strictly cargo planes. The air cargo system is vulnerable because of the
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lack of security protecting cargo access ramps; because cargo must make many stops at
various transposition nodes with disparate security measures; and because not all cargo
is screened before being loaded onto air cargo carriers.98 In a 2005 RAND study ranking
various terrorist threats from lowest to highest (1-100, respectively), airplane hijackings
did not even make the list, while a “bomb in uninspected cargo” received a ranking of
100. The complete list and rankings are as follows: Insider plants a bomb: 100; Bomb in
uninspected cargo: 100; Large truck bomb: 71; Luggage bomb: 45; Curbside car bomb:
33; Attack on terminal passenger areas: 26; Attack on airplane runway areas: 26;
Shoulder fired missile: 13; Attack on control tower or utility plant: 12; Sniper attack: 8;
and Mortar attack: 3.99 As this list demonstrates, threats to the U.S. transportation system
extend beyond commercial aviation and encompass potential rail, road, sea, and cargo
attacks.

Energy Systems
The U.S. economy relies on a predominately hydrocarbon energy system. An
energy system is “the integrated network of primary energy sources, fuel refinement and
power generation processes, and infrastructure that distribute energy for residential,
commercial, industrial, military, and transportation end use sectors.”100 An energy system
is defined by its inputs, throughputs and outputs. Inputs are primary energy sources in
their raw form, such as crude oil; throughputs are the conversion processes including
chemical, electrical, nuclear, and thermal; and outputs are the useable energy sources,
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like refined fuels and electricity, as well as waste byproducts, like pollution.101 An
interconnected, complex network of manpower and infrastructure is necessary to manage
the energy system at each stage (inputs, throughputs, and outputs) to ensure the U.S.
energy supply.
In essence, energy security can be defined as a nation’s secure and affordable
access to sufficient supplies of primary energy. The U.S. energy system is vulnerable
because of “its highly centralized and rigid networks, hazardous materials/fuel intensity,
the lack of large-scale fuel substitutability,” and the system’s growing use of
telecommunications networks and information sharing systems.102 U.S. energy
consumption is driven primarily by three sectors: petroleum, natural gas, and electricity,
with coal and nuclear power representing a smaller share of U.S. energy demand. Each of
these fuel sources contributes to satisfying U.S. energy demand, and thus any disruption
to one of these sectors would impact the entire fuel supply chain and would be
detrimental to the U.S. economy. Before considering the critical infrastructure facilitating
the current U.S. energy system, which would be the likely target of future terrorist attack,
it is helpful to first quantify American energy usage to contextualize the risk of damage
to each component of the U.S. Energy system.

Petroleum
Petroleum satisfies 41% of U.S. fuel demand, the highest of any fuel source.103
Approximately 90% of U.S. petroleum is converted into gasoline, while the remaining
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10% is used as feedstock for the manufacture of plastics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals,
foods, and other consumer products.104 The U.S. economy literally runs on petroleum: “It
is hard to think of many contemporary goods that are not produced from or do not utilize
petroleum or its related products, in whole or in part, at some point in their development,
transportation, or end use… Petroleum is not merely a commodity or fuel source, but the
basis for a way of life.”105
Notice, of the 21 million barrels of oil used in the U.S. everyday, 12 million are
imported.106 This creates additional risk since foreign oil dependence means that U.S.
energy supply chains depend upon transportation security which, as previously discussed,
is not secure. Another concerning facet of U.S. petroleum usage is that domestic demand
is rising: the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) models “indicate that
petroleum demand will rise approximately 1.4% annually through 2025, when Americans
will consume almost 28 million barrels of oil per day, 19 million of which will be
imported.”107 Thus, American reliance on petroleum, in conjunction with the fact that
large quantities of oil are necessarily imported, creates risk for U.S. homeland security.

Natural Gas
Natural gas satisfies 22% of the annual U.S. energy demand, with over 175
million users in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors.108 Natural gas is
primarily used to heat and cool residential homes, and as chemical feedstock for the
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production of other goods. In 2004, the United States used roughly 22 trillion cubic feet
of natural gas, and yet produced only 18.7 trillion cubic feet. Thus, the U.S. imports 15%
of its natural gas demand, mostly from Canada.109 As with petroleum, the domestic
demand for natural gas is forecast to increase through 2025: the EIA estimates that U.S.
demand will reach 30.7 trillion cubic feet per year by 2025.110

Electricity
In 2004, more than 136 million users in the U.S. consumed more than 3,548
million megawatt hours of electricity.111 The electricity sector is particularly vulnerable
to terrorism because it is “characterized by a high degree of interdependency, meaning
that a power loss in one aspect of the system can result in a cascading series of failures
elsewhere.”112 To be clear, interdependency, in relation to the electricity sector, is defined
as “the mutual functional reliance of essential services—on other networks, utilities,
services, or auxiliary non-utility systems.”113 The physical interdependency of related
services using electricity creates an endless list of possible threats since the loss of
electricity would result in the loss of a range of dependent services from communications
systems to the power supply. For example, with the loss of power comes the loss of first
responders in the event of a terrorist incident. Other interdependencies exist because
electricity is generated from other fuel sources including coal, natural gas, and nuclear
power.
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The economic repercussions of any large-scale loss of electricity are severe, as
demonstrated by the August 2003 power failure in parts of the United States and Canada.
In that instance, 50 million people lost electricity for days in the U.S. and weeks in
Canada, and economic loss estimates from the event range from $4-$10 billion.114 Even
after power was restored, it took authorities months to determine the cause of the outage.
The long investigation into the outage demonstrates the complexity of the current system
in which “there are multitudes of opportunities for disruptions at the same time that there
are lowering tolerances for disruptions.”115 More specifically, there are three major
electric grids in the U.S.—the Eastern, the Western and the Texas Interconnections
Systems—all of which connect into the Province of Quebec Interconnection.116 To
quantify the value of the U.S. electric grid, consider that the grid network has a
generating capacity of over 960 gigawatts and is valued at over $1 trillion in assets.117

Coal
America has approximately 25% of the world’s recoverable coal reserves, the
highest of any country; and coal meets 23% of total U.S. primary energy demand.118 At
the present rate of use—about 1 billion short tons per year—the EIA forecasts that the
United States has a coal supply of at least 250 years remaining.119 Coal is cheap to
produce making it an attractive fuel source for electricity-generating power plants: “coalfired power plants account for approximately 92% of U.S. coal consumption and generate
114
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about half of U.S. electricity.”120 Despite a shift in energy policy to favor cleaner fuels,
there will be 72 additional coal-fired power plants in operation by 2015.

Nuclear
Nuclear energy also helps to satisfy U.S. energy demand, providing about 20% of
total electricity generation, or about 780 million hours of electricity, in 2004.121 The
tension that exists within the nuclear energy production sector is between the benefits of
clean nuclear energy and the risk nuclear energy creates for both terrorism and public
health. Nuclear power generation creates toxic nuclear waste that could potentially be
used as a weapon or could harm the general public if not disposed of properly. There is
momentum to convert to next-generation technologies, like pebble bed modular reactors
which are smaller and generate less waste than traditional reactors, and are also “designed
for safety, proliferation resistance, and ease of operation.”122 A large-scale transition to
new technology requires time, but in the short-term, there is significant public opposition
to constructing new conventional nuclear power facilities and, for this reason, nuclear
power is not expected to increase its share of total U.S. energy consumption in the shortterm.

Critical Infrastructure
The purpose of outlining the components of U.S. fuel demand is to demonstrate
that energy security involves numerous sectors and an interdependent system. Critical
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infrastructure is fundamental to the energy system, and is thus the likely target of any
energy system terrorist attack. Crucial infrastructure, as defined by the National Strategy
for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, includes “facilities,
systems and functions comprised of human assets and physical and cyber systems that
work together in processes that are highly interdependent and reliant on key nodes for
their operation.”123 To be classified as “critical,” infrastructure must be important enough
that its destruction would disrupt or foreclose crucial services at a national level, creating
a threat to homeland security. In addition to critical infrastructure, there are individual
targets whose destruction would cause mass casualties, significant property damage, or
have a profound effect on national prestige. The common members of this class are
nuclear power plants and dams.
The most vulnerable infrastructure systems, especially for petroleum (America’s
number one fuel source), are refineries and pipelines. These assets are susceptible to
physical attack because they are stationary, conspicuously located, and largely
consolidated in the Gulf Coast region. There is also the risk of cyber attack since many
refineries and pipelines rely heavily on the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) computer systems. Energy Sector nodes are particularly at risk: “a wellcoordinated terrorist attack could take out the nation’s gas transmission systems and keep
key pipelines out of service for an extended period of time resulting in enormous personal
and economic damage.”124
The electricity sector is vulnerable to physical, cyber, and electromagnetic
attacks. The threat of a physical attack on electricity systems is exacerbated by the highly
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centralized generation of U.S. electricity. Similarly, a cyber attack on the electricity
system is also a concern because, like other Energy Sector components, the U.S.
electricity system uses SCADA. Some experts refer to SCADA as “the Achilles’ heel of
the energy system,” because of the heavy Energy Sector reliance on that network.125
In addition to this analysis of general threats facing U.S. energy systems, it is also
necessary, in order to determine actual risk and security limitations for the U.S. Energy
Sector, to quantify assets and infrastructure. To that end, consider the following figures:
over two million miles of pipeline carry oil, natural gas, refined fuels, hydrogen, and
other hazardous materials throughout the United States.126 More specifically, 1.4 million
miles of pipeline carry almost all of America’s natural gas, and of this quantity, nearly
two-thirds transverse public and commercial infrastructure at some point in transport.127
There are roughly 700,000 active natural gas and oil wells in the U.S., as well as 2,000
petroleum storage terminals.128 More than 17 million barrels of oil are refined each day in
any of the 151 refineries nationwide; with 43% refined in facilities along the Gulf Coast,
predominately in Louisiana and Texas.129 Some 580 natural gas plants process over 60
billion cubic feet of natural gas per day, with more than 50% of that amount treated in
facilities in Louisiana and Texas.130 There are more than 3,000 independent utilities in the
United States operating about 11,000 conventional coal, natural gas, petroleum, and duelfire electric power plants.131 American electricity is routed over 181,000 miles of high-
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voltage power lines to commercial and residential destinations.132 More than 65% of the
nation’s coal is at least partially transported by rail, and in some regions, there is only one
railroad to deliver coal supplies.133 Finally, as of 2005, there are 104 nuclear reactors in
use, and another 36 research reactors located primarily at universities and other
educational institutions.134
Energy security is encumbered not only by the size and complexity of the energy
system, but also because no one agency or department is responsible for this sector of
homeland security. There are a multitude of players involved in regulating and protecting
the energy industry including: DHS, the Department of Commerce, the Department of
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior, the
Department of Transportation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the North American Electric
Reliability Council, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Furthermore, most critical energy infrastructure in the United States is privately
owned, and most owners secure their assets only against low-level threats like vandalism
and commercial espionage. This approach requires minimal effort and cost since lessthan-perfect security is sufficient. For the private sector, the short-term gains resulting
from minimal security outweigh the long-term benefits of more expensive security as
terrorist attacks are a relatively small risk while profit is an immediate demand. To
improve energy security, the government must intervene in markets to weight the costbenefit analysis in favor of long-term security gains over individual profit. Each
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proprietor’s risk might be small, but an unprotected energy system creates an
unacceptable aggregate vulnerability for homeland security.
This concludes the threat assessment for U.S. homeland security, but before
considering homeland security measures and expenditures, it is helpful to contextualize
risk by quantifying the threat posed by terrorism in the past as a model for current and
future risk. The best way to do this is to examine trends in terrorism over time.

Trends in Terrorism: 1968-2009
This trend analysis uses the State Department’s definition of a terrorist attack
since the State Department is responsible for collecting and organizing terrorist attack
data. To appreciate this trend analysis, it is crucial to understand the criteria used to
determine what constitutes a terrorist attack. According to the State Department,
“terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, and is usually
intended to influence an audience.”135 Most scholars of terrorism consider 1968 to be the
first year in the modern era of terrorism characterized by more dramatic, large-scale
events. The year 1968 is designated as “the significant breaking point” in the history of
terrorism because, that year, Palestinian guerillas launched the first “sustained campaign
of airline hijackings and sabotage… on a scale of violence and intensity never before
seen by the international community.”136 Because 1968 is often cited as the beginning of
modern terrorism, this essay will focus on attack data from 1968-2008. The year 2008 is
135
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the last year considered in this analysis because 2008 is the last year for which there are
completed annual terror incidents reports for both the State Department and the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
The overarching trend to note for the last 20 years is that, while the number of
terrorist incidents has decreased since 1990, the total number of causalities has increased
significantly. From 1988-1992, there were 2,345 international terrorist incidents recorded
resulting in 4,325 causalities (persons killed or injured).137 Then, in the next five-year
interval from 1993-1997, the number of incidents declined to 1,793 but with 13,092
casualties.138 In the following five-year interval from 1998-2002, incidents again
declined, this time to 1,649 and causalities rose once again to 16,807.139
Trend statistics change in 2003 and become incompatible with the pre-2003
method of classifying terrorist events. This is because, in 2003, the State Department
chose not to count numerous terrorist incidents which distorted the figures to result in a
decline in both incidents and casualties; this was subsequently revealed. In the revised
report the numbers for both incidents and casualties showed marked increases from 2002.
An investigation into the reporting discrepancy revealed that the State Department may
have intentionally misconstrued data to claim that the U.S was making “significant
progress in the war against terrorism.”140
After this scandal, the State Department’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report
became the “Country Report on Terrorism.” Thus, for 2004 and 2005, this paper

137

LaFree, Gary, Sue-Ming Yang, and Martha Crenshaw. Trajectories of Terrorism: Attack patterns of
foreign groups that have targeted the United States, 1970–2004. Stanford University, Web. 31 Mar. 2011.
<http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22662/Crenshaw_Trajectories_of_terrorism.pdf>.
138
Ibid.
139
Ibid.
140
Ibid.

51

employs the attack figures compiled by the NCTC which based their numbers on
different criteria than the State Department. However, comparisons are again possible
from 2005 onward because, beginning in that year, the NCTC collection methods
included all terrorism incidents and were therefore compatible with the earlier State
Department reports.
From 2005 through 2007, the number and lethality of terrorist incidents increased,
but, interestingly, in 2008, there was an 18% decrease in number of terrorist incidents and
a 30% decrease in the number of persons killed in terrorist attacks.141 The table below
represents the data from 2005-2008; figures are taken from NCTC.
Year

Number of Incidents

Number of Deaths

2005

11,156

14,616

2006

14,570

20,872

2007

14,499

22,685

2008

11,770

15,765

From 2005-2008, Iraq had more terrorist incidents than any other country. As a
percentage of total terrorist attacks, Iraq represented 30% in 2005, 45% in 2006, and 43%
in 2007.142 In terms of total terror incident fatalities, Iraq represented 60% in 2005, 65%
in 2006, and 60% in 2007.143 In 2005-2008 the data overwhelmingly supports the notion
that most terrorist incidents occur in the region in which the terror group is located. In
those years, the Near East and South Asia had exponentially more incidents of terrorism
141
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and fatalities than any other location. The table below depicts this trend and again, the
figures are taken from NCTC.
2005
Attacks
4,222
4,022
1,005

Near East
South Asia
East
Asia/Pacific
Western
868
Hemisphere
Europe/
780
Eurasia
Africa
256

Deaths
8,708
3,046
758

2006
Attacks
7,755
3,654
1,036

Deaths
13,691
3,609
854

2007
Attacks
7,540
3,807
1,429

854

Deaths
14,010
4,737
1,119

2008
Attacks
4,594
4,354
978

Deaths
5,528
5,826
762

826

556

482

405

352

370

373

659

220

606

227

774

292

879

422

1,643

835

2,187

718

2,987

As previously mentioned, the latest NCTC and State Department reports on
terrorism look at incidents from 2008. According to the NCTC report, there were 11,800
attacks in 2008 resulting in over 54,000 deaths, injuries, and kidnappings.144 Of those
incidents, there were 235 high-casualty incidents (attacks resulting in 10 or more deaths),
75% of which occurred in the Near East and South Asia. In Africa, particularly in
Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the number of fatalities rose to
2,200, a 140% increase from 2007. Attacks in the Western Hemisphere decreased by
25% and attacks in East Asia and the Pacific declined by 30% from 2007 levels.
In 2008, according to NCTC, Muslims represented over 50% of the more than
50,000 victims of terrorist attacks; most of these deaths were a result of incidents in Iraq,
Pakistan and Afghanistan. This finding is important because it indicates that terror groups
may be making a tactical error by killing members of their base and thus undermining
local support.

144

National Counterterrorism Center 2008 Report on Terrorism. Web. 5 Apr. 2011.
<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2008.pdf>.

53

In the 2009 report, “Trajectories of Terrorism: Attack Patterns of Foreign Groups
That Have Targeted the U.S., 1970-2004,” Gary LaFree, Sue-Ming Yang, and Martha
Crenshaw consider the 16,916 attacks executed between 1970 and 2004 by the 53 terror
groups identified by the State Department as posing a significant threat to America. From
that data, LaFree, Yang and Crenshaw determined that “just 3% of attacks by these
designated anti-U.S. groups were actually directed at the U.S.” and that “99% of attacks
targeting the U.S. did not occur on U.S. soil but were aimed at U.S. targets in other
countries.”145 Moreover, according to the study, 90% of attacks by these groups were
domestic, occurring within the country in which the group is based.
The study also distinguishes two dichotomous trend lines between total attacks
against the U.S and total fatalities resulting from those attacks. With respect to the first
trend, total attacks, the series reveals that of the 111 total attacks against the U.S., the
majority occurred in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s; in 1974 there were 38 attacks
and in 1990 there were 41 attacks. After 1990, the number of total attacks declines until
the end of the series (2004). Interestingly, the second trend line, total fatalities, shows that
the number of total fatal attacks against the U.S. increased steadily in from the late
1990’s until the end of the series in 2004. In fact, the peak year for fatal attacks occurred
in 2004, the last year considered, with 9 fatal attacks. Notice, this series demonstrates
that, though terrorist organizations are not attacking the United States with greater
frequency, their attacks are becoming more sophisticated and deadlier.
Another important finding of this study is that terror groups that are considered a
significant threat to U.S. security pose a more significant threat to other countries. For
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example, in 1990, the peak year in the series for attacks against the U.S., there were only
41 attacks, whereas in 1991, the peak year of the series for non-U.S. attacks, there were
1,499 attacks. Likewise, there were 9 fatal attacks against the U.S. in the peak year of the
series, 2004, whereas there were 536 fatal attacks against non-U.S. targets in the peak
year of the series, 1989.
The Study also found that, of the 570 anti-U.S. attacks, only 5 (1%), occurred on
U.S. soil. The other attacks, all occurring on foreign soil, included 233 attacks against
U.S. businesses, 106 against diplomats and embassies, and 96 against the U.S. military.
The remaining attacks struck various targets including educational institutions,
journalists, nongovernmental organizations and tourists. These statistics indicate that
proximity to the target is crucial in determining targets for terrorist attacks.
An analysis of trends in terrorism has several important implications for
policymakers. First, anti-U.S. terrorist groups rarely attack the United States on U.S. soil,
meaning that those responsible for allocating limited security funds must strive to protect
U.S. assets abroad which are at greater risk of attack. Second, though the number of total
attacks continues to decline, the lethality of those attacks has increased. This indicates
that mass-causalities attacks are more prominent than in the past. Thus, security funds
should be allocated to secure likely targets of mass-causality attacks.
This concludes the consideration of current risk to U.S. homeland security with
respect to terrorist actors, weapons-technologies, attack methods and historical trends.
The next chapter will address cost in terms of actual appropriations and existing threatspecific programs.
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Chapter Two: Cost

The purpose of Chapter Two is: (1) to examine what Federal programs exist to
address each of the threats to U.S. homeland security outlined in Chapter One; and (2) to
determine how much money the Federal Government spends on these programs (and
thus, how much the U.S. spends to address each threat listed in Chapter One). The threats
outlined in Chapter One were: Foreign Terror Groups, Homegrown Terrorists, IEDs,
Suicide Bombings, Assassinations, Missile Attacks, Aviation Attacks/Hijackings,
Kidnappings, Mass Disruption Attacks (Critical Infrastructure Attacks), Mass Destruction
Attacks (CBRN Attacks), Transportation Systems Attacks, Energy Systems Attacks and
Cyberterrorism.
Funding comparisons for this chapter begin with fiscal year (FY) 2007 and end in
FY 2010. This is because DHS underwent significant internal restructuring in 2006,
making it difficult to compare current programs with those existing before 2007, and
because, as of the writing of this paper, Congress has yet to pass a budget for FY2011. It
is also important to acknowledge that the funding and programs recognized in this paper
represent only programs whose primary purpose is to address the threat for which it is
being cited. For example, there are several federal programs with information-gathering
initiatives, but this paper only distinguishes intelligence programs with the sole purpose
of gathering intelligence. This decision to focus on threat-specific programs has two
implications. First, there may be other programs tangentially addressing the specific
terrorist threats being discussed, but it would be disingenuous to include funding for
those programs here since the purpose of this paper is to represent the true costs of U.S.
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anti-terrorism efforts. And second, even though anti-terrorism is the primary mission of
the programs distinguished here, a significant portion of their total program funding may
go towards other goals. Program expenditures are not often outlined in detail, and thus it
is usually impossible to determine the funding levels for initiatives within programs that
deviate from the program’s anti-terrorism mission. To return to an earlier example,
initiatives within the National Intelligence Program (NIP) may address threats or
missions unrelated to terrorism, but because intelligence programs are classified, there is
no ability to differentiate true anti-terrorism funding from the aggregate whole. This
paper attempts to deal with the issue of duplicitous program missions by selecting only
programs whose primary mission is anti-terrorism; nonetheless, this system will not yield
a perfect snapshot of U.S. anti-terrorism spending.
There are also negative externalities (such as reduced civil liberties) included in
the cost considerations below. However, since such factors are unquantifiable, they are
characterized as externalities (as opposed to a true cost). Even without a monetary value,
these negative externalities are important because they are real—no one denies that
increased intelligence authority to monitor U.S. citizens encroaches upon U.S. civil
liberties. The debate over invasive security measures, therefore, is not about whether
associated negative externalities exist in reality—they do— it is simply a question of
whether one’s liberty interest or one’s security interest prevails with respect to each
invasive program. This paper does not attempt to answer those normative questions, nor
does it assign monetary value to negative externalities; not because doing so is a bad idea
(in fact, that may be the most just way to factor unquantifiable rights into the policy costbenefit analyses), but because doing so would extend beyond the scope of this project.
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Instead, it is sufficient, for the purpose of this paper, to be aware of the negative
externalities, and to consider them as having a generally negative value.
Limitations aside, this chapter will respond to each of the threats to U.S.
homeland security outlined in Chapter One; some threats will be considered individually,
and some will be considered in reasonable pairings with similar threats.

Intelligence: Countering the Threat of Foreign and Domestic Terrorists
The foundation of any effective counterterrorism strategy is intelligence. Without
accurate intelligence, there is no ability to address any threat to U.S. homeland security—
the government cannot counter risk if there is no intelligence to illuminate what threats
exist. In Chapter One, there is an outline of the foreign terrorist organizations
representing a significant threat to U.S. homeland security, as well as a discussion of the
growing concern over “homegrown,” or domestic, terrorism. For both foreign and
domestic terrorism, intelligence is the necessary first phase of any defense strategy.
Intelligence discovers which terror groups are plotting against the U.S., where those
groups are currently located, what financial means the group possesses, the details of
potential attacks, the leadership and internal structure of the group, and the ideological
underpinnings and political motivations of group leadership. Without this information,
the U.S. cannot defend itself.
Intelligence funding data, like the work of intelligence community members, is
classified. Within the intelligence community, there are two distinct categories designated
during the appropriations process: the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the
Military Intelligence Program (MIP). NIP was formerly the National Foreign Intelligence
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Program and the MIP includes all DOD and armed forces intelligence programs.146 The
NIP authorization legislation requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to
disclose aggregate annual funding levels for NIP; but there is no similar obligation for
MIP officials. It is possible, therefore, to consider annual NIP funding levels, but it is not
possible to differentiate program-specific funding levels, or even individual agency’s
funding levels, from the total NIP budget authority. The majority of NIP and MIP
funding is housed in the Defense budget, but there are also intelligence funds in various
other agency and department budgets including the State Department, the FBI and the
DHS.147
The U.S. intelligence community includes: the CIA; the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State (INR); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the
National Security Agency (NSA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI); Army Intelligence; Navy Intelligence; Air Force Intelligence; Marine Corps
Intelligence; the intelligence components of DHS; the Coast Guard; the Treasury
Department; the Energy Department; and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).148 The
CIA is the lead agency within the intelligence community because of its global sphere of
operations that yield information on virtually every intelligence issue of interest for
policymakers. Despite this prominence, it is the three DOD intelligence agencies— the
NSA, the NRO, and the NGA—that consume the largest portion of intelligence funds.149
The NSA is responsible for signals intelligence; the NRO manages reconnaissance
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satellites; and the NGA collects geospatial data (meaning everything from physical maps
to electronic databases) to help the military map areas in an armed conflict so that the
U.S. can effectively use precision-guided weapons.150
For FY2010, NIP received $53.1 billion in federal funding; in FY2009, NIP
received $49.8 billion in federal funds; and in FY2008, NIP received $47.5 billion in
federal funds.151 When indexed for inflation, the NIP funding levels for FY2010,
FY2009, and FY2008 are $53.1billion, $50.6 billion, and $48.1 billion, respectively.
Additionally, in a public appearance in September 2009, former Director of National
Intelligence, Dennis Blair, said that the total annual intelligence funding, including both
NIP and MIP, was $75 billion.152
NIP and MIP intelligence funding is used to facilitate four major intelligence
collection systems, known as disciplines or “INTs.”153 The four major INTs are signals
intelligence (sigint), imagery intelligence (imint), human intelligence (humint), and
measurement and signatures analysis (masint).154 Sigint is the analysis of foreign
encryption systems; imint is the analysis of images from satellites, manned aircraft, and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); humint is the collection of human intelligence, under
both official and nonofficial cover; and masint is the application of complicated
analytical refinements to information collected by signals and image intelligence
operations.155 A fifth, less significant, INT is open source information analysis (osint)
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which is the study of publically available information like newspapers, books, radio,
television and the Internet.156
As previously noted, intelligence gathering is perhaps the most important
component of any counterterrorism strategy. Acquiring, analyzing and disseminating
intelligence is critical to American security. There is, however, one unquantifiable and
hugely important negative externality associated with intelligence: the violation of
American citizens’ privacy and civil liberties. The 9/11 attacks revealed the inability of
national and international intelligence agencies to share information and to monitor U.S.
citizens, leading lawmakers to pass the PATRIOT Act. This legislation is an unparalleled
encroachment upon American civil liberties as it allows the federal government to
monitor U.S. citizens in previously illegal ways. As this legislation demonstrates, there is
a tension between the most sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities and American
civil liberties. To balance American security and liberty interests, it is necessary to take
reductions in civil liberties into account as a cost of current intelligence initiatives.

First Responders: IEDs, Suicide Bombers, Missile Attacks and Mass Destruction
If efforts to counter terrorism fail, and the U.S. experiences an attack on American
soil, first-responders are responsible for meeting the crisis and for beginning the recovery
process. This is especially true of attacks involving IEDs, suicide bombers, missiles, and
CBRN weapons, all of which are capable of causing mass destruction. The U.S.
homeland security strategy is layered, not just in terms of multiple proactive efforts to
counter terrorism, but also in that security officials recognize that a major component of
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mitigating the risk of an IED, suicide, missile or CBRN attack, is to strengthen the ability
of first-responders to react to the attack. Because target selection is infinite, and because
there are simply too many plots, actors, and means of attack to prevent every future
terrorist incident, national investment in first-responders is the best way for the United
States to directly address the risk and consequences of a successful terrorist attack using
an explosive device.
Funding for emergency response teams comes primarily from state and local
treasuries. The federal government augments first-responder funds to alleviate the burden
of crisis planning for state and local budgets and to establish baseline standards for firstresponder training, capabilities, and equipment. This examination of first-responder
funding will only consider total federal funding, without regard for the specific
segmentation and dissemination of federal funds to the various states, tribes, territories,
and localities, because federal counterterrorism expenditures are the focus of this paper.
Federal funds for first responders come from the DHS budget, under the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funding in Title III: Protection, Preparedness,
Response and Recovery. Line items within this section for first-responders include “state
and local programs,” “firefighter assistance grants,” “emergency management
performance grants,” “U.S. fire administration,” “public health programs,” “emergency
food and shelter,” and “management and administration” expenses.157 Since
counterterrorism expenditures are the focus of this paper—as opposed to total DHS
expenditures—several line items of the FEMA budget were excluded from the funding
totals represented below. All FEMA natural disaster response funding was removed
157
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because this paper considers only man-made disasters. Excluded line items include:
“flood hazard mapping and risk analysis,” “national flood insurance fund,” “national
flood mitigation fund,” “national pre-disaster mitigation fund,” and “the disaster
assistance direct loan program.”158
To address total U.S. expenditures on countering the threat presented by IED,
suicide bombings and missile attacks (CBRN funds will not be including in this section,
although first-responders do represent a key component of countering CBRN threats;
instead, CBRN weapons will be subsequently addressed as an individual threat category),
it is necessary to incorporate one other funding area within the DHS budget. In Title IV:
Research and Development, Training and Services, under the “Science and
Technology—Research, Development, Acquisition and Operations” funding, there is an
“explosives” research line item.159 When taken together, first-responder funding and
explosives research funding for FY2010, FY2009, FY2008, and FY2007 totaled
$12,178,670,000;160 $12,408,594,000;161 $11,781,550,000;162 and $10,019,607,000,163
respectively. When indexed for inflation, funding levels for the series become:
$12,178,670,000 (FY2010); $12,746,272,930.85 (FY2009); $12,113,227,927.36
(FY2008); and $10,722,121,467 (FY2007).164 First-Responder funding, therefore,
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decreased by 4.5% from FY2009 to FY2010, increased by 5.2% from FY2008 to
FY2009, and increased by 13% from FY2007 to FY2008.
First-responders are responsible for assisting in incidents with various gradations
of severity: some incidents can be handled at the local level; others classify as national
disasters meriting federal intervention. Thus, the greatest challenge for first-responder
units is to maintain the necessary level of preparedness to assist in worst-case scenarios
even though day-to-day responsibilities are much less complex. In this way, firstresponders split their time and resources between preparing for mundane incidents and
preparing for unlikely, high-stakes events. To help first-responders manage this
duplicitous objective, DHS created the National Response Framework in 2008 to clarify
the operational response framework for all levels of authority. In addition to its governing
function as the strategic architecture for incident first response, the National Response
Framework also helps distinguish how federal first-responder funds are spent. Before
discussing the ways in which federal funds are expended, it is useful to enumerate what
actors comprise first-responder units at the local, state, and federal levels.
At the local level, first-responders include police, firefighters, emergency medical
service providers, emergency management, public works, and environmental response
professionals.165 NGOs and not-for-profit organizations also constitute first-responders,
since NGOs often perform critically important service missions (including providing food
and shelter) and since there are a myriad of not-for-profit operators of critical
infrastructure (particularly healthcare and power generation facilities) necessary for first-
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responders to meet the demands of any crisis.166 There are also local-level private-sector
organizations which protect critical infrastructure facilities, networks, and
communications systems, and thus also count as first-responders.167
State governments – and, more specifically, state governors—are responsible for
organizing resources and coordinating response efforts with other jurisdictions including
other states, First American tribes, and the federal government, if necessary. Disaster
response resources available to states include state emergency management and
homeland security agencies, state police, health agencies, transportation administrations,
and incident management teams.168 If state resources are insufficient to address a crisis,
the governor can petition other states or the federal government for resource assistance
through mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact.169
If the affected state’s governor requests assistance, the federal government
contributes to disaster and crisis response through a variety of programs and agencies that
provide human, financial, and systems resources. There are also incidents that fall
squarely under the purview of the federal government, namely those taking place on a
military base, on a federal facility, or on federal lands.170 After passage of the Homeland
Security Act in 2002, the Secretary of Homeland Security became the official head of
domestic incident management.171
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The National Response Framework contains a “National Response Doctrine” that
clarifies roles for first-responders at every level of government, and that constructs an
operational framework to provide a layered incidence response that can be scaled to fit
the needs of any crisis. “The National Response Doctrine” establishes five key principles:
Engaged Partnerships; Tiered Response; Scalable, Flexible, and Adaptable Operational
Capabilities; Unity of Effort Through Unified Command; and Readiness to Act.172
Engaged Partnerships mean that leaders from every level of government, in
collaboration with private-sector, NGO, and not-for-profit partners, communicate to
understand the goals, resources, and the role for each level of government within the
national strategic framework. The most important aspect of the “engaged partnerships”
principle is preparedness. According to DHS, preparedness is “the process of identifying
the personnel, training, and equipment needed for a wide range of potential incidents, and
developing jurisdictional-specific plans for delivering capabilities when needed.”173 To
be prepared, partners from all levels of responders partake in training exercises and
evaluation critiques to hone their response skills. These exercises are outlined in the
National Preparedness Guidelines and the National Exercise Program, which contains
15 National Planning scenarios, focusing on 37 core capabilities that are the inspiration
for a national exercise schedule.174
The second principle, “Tiered Response,” simply refers to the DHS mandate that
incidents are to be handled at the lowest possible level of government (or jurisdiction)
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and supported by additional resources and actors when necessary.175 The third principle,
“Scalable, Flexible, and Adaptable Operational Capabilities,” refers to the DHS
understanding that crises come in different sizes and have gradient scopes, complexities,
and resource needs to which first-responders must be able to assess and then respond to
meet the requirements of the specific incident, both initially and as response transitions to
recovery.176
The fourth principle, “Unity of Effort Through Unified Command,” is a detailed
understanding of the chain of command that coordinates local, state, and federal efforts in
a crisis. The Incident Command System (ICS) establishes a structure enabling agencies
with divergent legal, jurisdictional, and functional responsibilities to harmonize their
response efforts and resources.177 “Readiness to Act,” the fifth principle, refers to DHS’
“forward-leaning posture” to engaging in incident response to prevent incidents from
growing in size or complexity.178 Implementing this principle requires nimble resources,
human and otherwise, training exercises, incident communication and institutionalized
response chains of command to allow resources to flow expeditiously to incident sites.
The final point to make about first-responder funding is that there are a host of
other implicated federal departments and agencies whose budgets incorporate incident
response funding, but which are not included in this paper. The reason these agencies and
departments are excluded is because they do not actual expend federal funds for crisis
response unless there is an incident, and this paper considers only actual spending, as
opposed to total available funding.
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Unlike DHS, which is involved in planning for crises, these other federal agencies
engage in crisis management on a situational basis. DHS publishes a list of the situationspecific partnerships that support DHS efforts. To demonstrate this, consider the
following list of possible targets and the corresponding agency or department that would
then be involved in response efforts: (1) transportation systems: the Department of
Transportation; (2) communications: the DHS; (3) public works and engineering: the
DOD (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers); (4) massive fire: the Department of Agriculture
(U.S. Forest Service); (5) public health epidemic: the Department of Health and Human
Services; (6) oil and hazardous material spill: the EPA; (7) agricultural contamination:
the Department of Agriculture; (8) energy systems: the Department of Energy; and (9)
public safety or security concern: the Department of Justice.179 As this list demonstrates,
it would be disingenuous to present first-response as a DHS issue; depending on the
nature of a crisis, there could be many involved agencies and thus funding for firstresponse could come from a number of various federal budgets. Again, because these
funds are not expended annually, they are not considered here, and first-responder
funding to counter the threat of a terrorist attack remains the exclusive product of DHS
budget authority.
Before concluding this section of first-responder funding, it is necessary to
discuss emergency communications systems. Especially after 9/11, DHS understands that
a successful response to a terrorist attack – or any large-scale incident—requires a
coordinated effort from first-responders comprised of representatives from public safety,
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public health, and the emergency management community.180 The only way to organize
these various first-responder units is with a functioning emergency communications
system. To ensure state and local emergency communications systems are adequate, DHS
provides funding to augment local budgets for the express purpose of strengthening
emergency communications. In FY2010-FY2007, DHS provided $552,113,000
(FY2010);181 $504,400,000 (FY2009);182 $366,195,000 (FY2008);183 and $251,114,000
(FY2007)184 for the DHS Office of Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications and
for the DHS Office of Emergency Communications. When indexed for inflation, the
actual funding level for these DHS offices was: $552,113,000 (FY2010); $518,126,394
(FY2009); $376,504,238 (FY2008); and $268,720,600 (FY2007).185 These figures
demonstrate a 7% increase for emergency communications systems funding from
FY2009 to FY2010; a 38% funding increase from FY2008 to FY2009; and a 40%
funding increase from FY2007 to FY2008. This remarkable upward trend in DHS
emergency communications system funding is part of a larger initiative to improve the
emergency response weaknesses exposed by the 9/11 attacks.
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Assassination and Kidnapping
Assassination is a very common mode of terrorism, and is typically used to target
politicians, diplomats, military personnel, dignitaries, and reporters. Kidnapping is a far
less common means of attack, mostly because the logistics of executing a successful
kidnapping are complex. However, kidnappings do occur, especially in failed or failing
states. DHS relies on the U.S. Secret Service, an agency within DHS, to counter the threat
to U.S. homeland security represented by assassinations and kidnappings of high-level
political figures. The one caveat is that the Secret Service only protects civilians of
significance. Thus, there are no preventative actions taken to avoid the assassination or
kidnapping of mundane citizens, apart from basic information available to travelers on
the State Department website. Once an average American citizen is killed or kidnapped,
however, the U.S. does respond with force. This course of reactive (rather than proactive)
action is the be strategy since a civilian assassination or kidnapping is not nearly as
psychologically traumatizing to a population as the assassination or kidnapping of an
important political figure. The magnitudes of those two terrorist scenarios (one involving
an average civilian, the other a significant figure) are distinctly different, which is why is
important to protect the powerful and socially important members of society, but not
others.
U.S. Secret Service (USSS) funding comes from Title II: Security, Enforcement,
and Investigations of the DHS budget, under the subheading: “U.S. Secret Service.”186
Funding levels for the USSS for FY2010-FY2007 were: $2,957,338,000 (FY2010);187
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$2,797,887,700 (FY2009);188 $2,763,542,000 (FY2008);189 and $2,545,866,000
(FY2007).190 When indexed for inflation, these annual funding levels become:
$2,957,338,000 (FY2010); $2,874,027,488.9 (FY2009); $2,841,342,109.7 (FY2008); and
$2,724,366,783.1 (FY2007).191 Thus, from FY2007 to FY2008, USSS funding increased
by 4.29%; from FY2008 until FY2009, USSS funding increased by 1.15%; and from
FY2009 to FY2010 USSS funding increased by 2.9%.
The USSS uses federal funding to fulfill its two-pronged mission “to safeguard
the nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the
economy, and to protect national leaders, visiting heads of state and government,
designated sites and National Special Security Events (NSSEs).”192 As the USSS mission
statement explicitly notes, there are two key functions for Secret Service personnel:
investigation and protection.
With respect to investigations, the USSS is responsible for protecting critical
financial infrastructure by tracking and preventing the circulation of counterfeit U.S.
currency, and by investigating financial and electronic crimes.193 The proportion of
counterfeit U.S. currency to genuine U.S. currency in circulation remains very low, only
about .0001% of currency worldwide is counterfeit, but the total amount of currency in
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circulation has grown steadily, doubling over the last decade, meaning that the sheer
volume of fraudulent currency that exists has grown.194
Adding to USSS currency challenges are advances in technology, specifically
printing and photographic computer technologies, which allow criminals to print
fraudulent currency using over-the-counter inkjet printers.195 Specifically, USSS
determined that the level of digitally produced counterfeit U.S. currency increased from
1% to 54% over the last decade.196 And while U.S. currency is redesigned every seven to
ten years, older currency is left in circulation and thus fraudulent bills remain viable so
long as the bill design after which the counterfeit piece is modeled is still accepted.197
USSS efforts to combat counterfeit currency include: the use of fingerprint detection and
forensic science in investigations; a continuous initiative to improve currency design, in
collaboration with the U.S. Mint, the Department of the Treasury, and the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing; studies of how U.S. currency circulates abroad; partnerships with
private-sector actors to restrict the availability of commercial grade printers; and work
with international financial institutions, governments, and law enforcement units to deter
counterfeit currency originating abroad.198
As for financial crimes, advances in technology facilitated the proliferation of ecommerce, online transactions, and profoundly changed the nature of USSS
investigations to include many more electronic crimes involving identity theft or a
fraudulent payment system online. In 2006, e-commerce represented 2.74% of all retail
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sales (about $100 billion), and, according to the Better Business Bureau, 8.9 million U.S.
citizens were victims of identity theft, resulting in a loss of over $50 billion for victims
and businesses.199 USSS initiatives to investigate and prevent financial crimes include:
efforts to prioritize investigations to focus resources on crimes with a “significant impact
of the economy, the community and the critical financial infrastructure;” working with
the financial payment industry to strengthen identification verification systems; and
educating federal, state, local and international law enforcement agencies, as well as
citizens and community leaders, on electronic and financial crime prevention and
detection.200
The second prong of the USSS mission is to protect American leaders, visiting
heads of state (and government), designated sites, and National Special Security Events
(NSSEs).201 Beginning in 1901, after the assassination of President McKinley, the USSS
was charged with protecting the President of the United States. Shortly thereafter, that
mission expanded to incorporate other national leaders, presidential candidates, visiting
heads of state and government, some critical infrastructure, and events of national
import.202 Funds allocated for this mission go towards personnel needs, intelligence
collection systems, new technologies and equipment, physical infrastructure security
(such as the White House complex, the Vice President’s residence, and foreign
missions).203
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The costs associated with protection of national leaders and certain pieces of
significant national infrastructure extend beyond the USSS budget. There is also the
unquantifiable cost with respect to access. Citizens of a democratic regime expect access
to their elected officials. Unfortunately, the USSS efforts to protect national leaders
severely limit public access to officials. Given the existence of terror plots, and
assassination plots generally, it is not surprising that the USSS takes extreme
precautionary measures to contrive the accessibly, and even visibility, of elected officials.
This is a cost, however, and as a cost; limited access must be taken into account when
examining the legitimacy of public expenditures to prevent assassination and kidnapping
incidents.

Transportation Systems
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) works with the law
enforcement and intelligence communities to protect all components of the U.S.
transportation system – including aviation, rail, transit, highway, and pipeline—to ensure
the free movement of people and commerce.204 Securing the entire transportation system
is costly; fortunately, some of the funding burden for TSA is displaced through fee
collections, the proceeds from which augment the TSA budget. After being indexed for
inflation, but before the additional revenue from fees is taken into account, the net
appropriation for the TSA in FY2010, FY2009, FY2008, and FY2007 was:

204

Transportation Security Administration. Department of Homeland Security. Web. 12 Mar. 2011.
<http://www.tsa.gov/index.shtm>.

74

$5,258,446,000;205 $4,400,558,200;206 $4,133,875,570207 and $3,816,967,062208
respectively.209 These figures indicate a 19.5% increase in congressionally allocated
funds for TSA activities from FY2009 to FY2010; a 6.5% increase from FY2008 to
FY2009; and an 8.3% increase from FY2007 to FY2008.
A true reading of the TSA budget, however, has to include all available TSA
funds, which include the revenue from fee collections. After indexed for inflation, and
once fees are taken into account, the TSA budget authority for series years FY2010FY2007 was: $7,656,066,000 (FY2010);210 $7,081,517,146 (FY2009);211 $7,005,326,092
(FY2008)212 and $6,755,608,117 (FY2007).213 Thus, there was an 8% increase in total
TSA budget authority from FY2009 to FY2010, a 1.1% increase from FY2008 to
FY2009, and a 4% increase from FY2007 to FY2008.
TSA funds are used to support six program areas: grants, law enforcement, layers
of U.S. aviation security, the Screening Partnership Program, the Transportation Systems
Sector, and Reimbursement Agreements.214 With respect to the first program area, the
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TSA awards grant funding to help protect critical transportation infrastructure including
transit systems, freight railroad carriers, ferries, and the trucking industry from acts of
terrorism and other large-scale incidents.215
As for the second program area, there are four law enforcement programs funded
by the TSA. First, the Federal Air Marshal Program –the primary law enforcement
division of TSA—deploys federal air marshals on domestic and international flights to
detect and respond to hostile acts committed during a flight targeting U.S. air carriers,
airports, passengers and crews.216 Second, the National Explosives Detection Canine
Team uses highly trained dogs to locate and identify materials that may be dangerous to
passengers or threaten the transportation system.217 Third, Federal Flight Deck Officers
are armed pilots who are authorized by TSA to use a firearm to respond to an act of
criminal violence or “air piracy” to gain control of the aircraft.218 Fourth, crewmembers
are trained to serve a protective function through the Crew Member Self Defense
Program, whereby flight and cabin crewmembers receive one-day, hands-on self-defense
training, free of charge.219
The third TSA program area is the “layers” of U.S. aviation security, which
include Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams, travel document
checkers, behavior detection officers, the secure flight program, Federal Air Marshals,
Federal Flight Deck Officers, employee screening, and checkpoint screening
technology.220 VIPR Teams support security efforts at critical transportation facilities in
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urban areas across the U.S., and are composed of Federal Air Marshals, Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors, Transportation Security Officers, Behavior Detection
Officers, and Explosive Detection Canine Teams.221 Travel document checkers are
Transportation Security Officers trained to use black light technology and magnifying
loops to examine the identifications and boarding passes of passengers at every airport in
the U.S.222 Behavior Detection Officers use “non-intrusive” observation techniques to
analyze the behavior of passengers to identify any potentially dangerous individuals.223
The Secure Flight program is a TSA-operated watch list-matching program that services
all airline carriers.224 The Federal Air Marshal Program and the Federal Flight Deck
Officer Program were defined above. TSA, through its Transportation Security Officer
program, also screens airport employees working on the secure side of the airport— or
the side that passengers reach after going through security.225 The final layer of TSA
aviation security is check point screening technologies, which are used to screen all
baggage and passengers, and include: Imaging Technology (full-body scanners),
Explosive Trace Detection, Explosive Detection System, CastScope (allows TSA to
screen casts and prosthetics), Bottle Liquid Scanners, Threat Image Projection, and the
Paperless Boarding Pass Pilot Program.226
The fourth TSA program area is the Screening Partnership Program (SPP or “Optout”), which allows airport operators to request to have security screening measures for
their individual airport conducted by a private contractor working under federal
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Transportation Security Administration. Department of Homeland Security. Web. 12 Mar. 2011.
<http://www.tsa.gov/index.shtm>.
222
Ibid.
223
Ibid.
224
Ibid.
225
Ibid.
226
Ibid.

77

oversight.227 As of 2011, there are 16 U.S. airports making use of the SSP and private
screening companies.228
The Transportation Systems Sector is the fifth program area funded by the TSA,
and this sector encompasses all modes of transportation (aviation, maritime, mass transit,
highway, freight rail, and pipeline), and is an interdependent, massive networked
system.229 The general security strategy for this system, as developed by the Office of
Transportation Sector Network Management, calls for: (1) completion of industry threat,
vulnerability, and consequence assessments; (2) development of baseline security
standards; (3) assessment of operator security status versus existing standards; (4)
development of a plan to close gaps in security standards; and (5) enhancement of
systems security for each mode of transportation covered by the system.230
The Transportation Systems Sector is so vast that enumerating all of the roughly
120 programs within it would far exceed the scope and purpose of this paper.231 To
quantify the size of the Sector, consider statistics from a few of the Sector’s component
parts. With respect to freight rail, there are 559 railroads in the U.S.; 139,929 miles of
track; 186,957 freight rail employees; 1,390,000 railcars; and the freight rail industry’s
annual revenue of $54 billion.232 With respect to highway motorcars, there are 46,934
miles of interstate highway 116,813 miles of national highway system roads; 3,884,777
miles of other roads; 599,766 bridges (over 20 feet in span); 3,137 bus companies with
29,325 motor coach buses; and there are 703,000 active U.S. motor carrier companies
227
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operating nine million commercial trucks.233 In addition, there are also 161,189 miles of
hazardous liquid pipeline operated by over 200 operators; 309,000 miles of natural gas
transmission pipelines; and 1,300 operators with 1.9 million miles of natural gas
distribution pipelines.234 Security programs within this sector address vulnerabilities
within aviation, maritime, mass transit, highway, freight rail, and pipeline transportation
systems.
The final TSA-funded program area is Reimbursable Agreements. The TSA
Office of Acquisition, Reimbursable Agreements Team manages over 400 Other
Transaction Agreements (OTA) awards, which are issued to U.S. airports “for the public
good” and “to advance TSA security objectives” through the Law Enforcement Officer
Reimbursement Agreement Program (LEO), the National Explosives Detection Canine
Team Program (NEDCTP), and the Port Security Programs (PSP).235 TSA uses risk,
vulnerability, and consequence assessments as the primary way in which the agency
attempts to allocate resources to industries and assets, but as demonstrated by the breadth
of TSA initiatives, there are many unrelated modes of transportation comprising the
larger interconnected network of the U.S. transportation system. TSA funds go towards
programs to create nationwide transportation security standards and industry regulations
in an attempt to secure this disparate and privately owned transportation networks.
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Mass Disruption: Critical Infrastructure
The threat assessment in Chapter One describes a potential “mass disruption”
attack as an assault against critical infrastructure. According to DHS, U.S. critical
infrastructure include thousands of facilities that, if debilitated or destroyed, would cause
mass casualties, significant economic loses, and/or threaten public health and the ability
of the federal government to function.236 Several communication networks and
information sharing systems are also designated as critical infrastructure. The seminal
text on critical infrastructure protection is the 2003 National Strategy for The Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets. This report has been updated twice
since publication, once in 2006 and again in 2009. The 2003 report created eleven critical
infrastructure sectors and five key asset classes; the updated reports characterize the
original key asset classes as independent sectors. This paper will use the original report
categorizations, with eleven major sectors and five key asset classes, because this way of
framing critical infrastructure demonstrates the funding priority given to the eleven major
classes over the smaller asset classes housed within the larger sectors.
The original eleven sectors of critical infrastructure protection are: Agriculture
and Food, Banking and Finance, Chemical, Communications, Defense Industrial Bases,
Emergency Services, Energy, Healthcare and Public Health, Postal and Shipping,
Transportation, and Water.237 The five key assets classes are National Monuments and
Icons, Nuclear Power Plants, Dams, Government Facilities, and Commercial Assets.238
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Although total funding for critical asset protection is an amalgamation of resources from
federal, state, local, and private stakeholders, this paper will focus on DHS funds and
efforts since DHS is the federal authority responsible for critical asset protection.
All funding levels in this section are derived from DHS appropriations legislation
for the five-year period from FY 2006 through FY2010. In the last year of the series, FY
2010, DHS allocated $2,058,993,000 to critical infrastructure protection.239 Before
inflation is taken into account, the DHS funding levels for critical infrastructure
protection for fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009 are $643,387,000;240 $737,776,000;241
and $1,004,167,000242 respectively. When indexed for inflation, the absolute funding
levels for 2007, 2008, and 2009 are $676,629,685.6; $747,206,242.7; $1,020,633,434
respectively. This means that funding levels for critical infrastructure trended upward for
the four year period between 2007-2010 by 10.43% from 2007 to 2008, 36.6% from 2008
to 2009, and by 101.2% from 2009 to 2010. It is important to note that of that
$2,058,993,000 allocated for DHS critical infrastructure protection in FY2010,
$1,115,000,000 came from offsetting fee collections and thus is not a direct
appropriation.243 In no other year in the five-year series are offsetting fees included in
critical infrastructure budget authority, and thus the cross-year comparison between
FY2010 and all other series years shows a marked growth in critical infrastructure
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funding for FY2010. If the offset funds (totaling $1,115,000,000) are excluded from
cross-year comparisons, DHS critical infrastructure budget authority for FY2010 would
have decreased by 7.51% from FY2009 (when indexed for inflation).
Total DHS spending levels for critical infrastructure protection are derived by
combining investment totals from three areas of the DHS budget. Under Title III:
Protection, Preparedness, Response and Recovery, there are three budget line items for
critical infrastructure protection: the first two are under the subheading “National
Protection Program Directorate” (these include spending for “Infrastructure Protection”
and for the “Federal Protective Service”), and the third is under the subheading
“Infrastructure Protection and Information Security.”244
Now that funding levels for the series have been established, it is important to
understand how critical infrastructure appropriations are spent. As noted above, there are
eleven sectors of critical infrastructure to protect (Agriculture and Food, Banking and
Finance, Chemical, Commercial facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing,
Dams, Defense Industrial Bases, Emergency Services, Energy, Government Facilities,
Healthcare and Public Health, Information Technology, National Monuments, Nuclear,
Postal and Shipping, Transportation, and Water), as well as, five key asset categories
(National Monuments and Icons, Nuclear Power Plants, Dams, Government Facilities,
and Commercial Assets). To give a nuanced account of critical infrastructure
expenditures, each of these sectors and asset categories must be considered individually.
The first critical infrastructure sector is Agriculture and Food. In addition to DHS,
the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Health and Human
244
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Services (HHS) also play important roles in protecting the farms, food processing plants,
laboratories, storage facilities, and transportation systems that comprise the assets in this
sector of critical infrastructure protection.245 According to The Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets national strategy report, the Agriculture and Food
sector includes the supply chains for feedstock, animals, animal products, seed and
fertilizer; the crop production system; and the post-harvesting aspects of the food supply
chain, such as processing, packaging, production, storage, distribution, retail sales,
institutional food services, and restaurant/home consumption.246 To quantify this sector,
consider that it includes over 1,912,000 farms and 87,000 food-processing plants
nationwide.247
Protecting critical assets in this sector involves countering the threat of intentional
food contamination, perhaps from a biological agent introduced by terrorists, for a food
and agriculture system that is decentralized, has many access points, and is largely
privatized. Challenges to protecting agriculture and food systems in the U.S. are
increasing as a greater percentage of American food is being imported, transported long
distances, or extensively processed (either at home or abroad). To work to ensure food
safety, the U.S. established a food-safety system to monitor critical control points in the
agriculture and food supply chains with federal, state and local inspections of foodstuffs,
food processing plants, food storage facilities, and food service establishments.248 This
system notwithstanding, protecting Agriculture and Food assets requires improved
analytical methods for detecting biological agents in food products, in addition to
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enhanced laboratory capabilities. Current public health and agriculture laboratories are
able to detect the presence of traditional human pathogens (unintentional contamination),
but not unconventional agents (such as bio-agents that terrorists might use in an
attack).249
Food and animal transportation is another area of concern within the Agriculture
and Food sector. During long transportation routes, livestock, crops, and processed
foodstuffs pass through various transportation hubs, are stored in interim facilities, and
come into contact with a multitude of personnel and storage facilities. This has two
implications for food safety: first, critical infrastructure protection must include the
ability to impose standards for transporters, storage facilities and food/livestock handlers;
and second, there must be a way to track the transportation of food and livestock to allow
authorities to trace an outbreak back to the source of the contamination.
The final impediment to Agriculture and Food sector protection is the existing
disincentive for information sharing and threat notification. Historically, in the event of
contamination, individual producers (and, to a lesser extent, the entire market for the
specific food product) pay the economic consequences for an outbreak. This means that if
producers suspect serious contamination, they refrain from notifying authorities until it is
certain because of the tremendous personal financial cost of contamination. The
government must work to correct this market failure; in the event of a terrorist attack, it
will be necessary to move quickly to counter the contamination which can only be done if
the outbreak is reported expediently. The Agriculture and Food sector is an example of
critical infrastructure that incorporates actual facilities – like farms and processing
249
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plants—as well as a large, decentralized system. It is import to begin thinking about
critical infrastructure as more than individual buildings, monuments, and facilities.
The second critical infrastructure sector is Water. This sector is composed of two
components: fresh water supply and wastewater collection and treatment. With respect to
the first component (fresh water supply), critical infrastructure protection focuses on the
170,000 public water systems in the U.S. which depend on reservoirs (1,800 nationwide), dams, wells, aquifers, pumping stations, aqueducts, and transmission pipelines.250
Critical infrastructure protection for the second component (wastewater collection and
treatment) focuses on the 19,500 municipal sanitary sewer systems, which includes
800,000 miles of sewer lines.251 Wastewater facilities are responsible for collecting and
treating sewage; for processing water from domestic, commercial, and industrial sources;
and for operating storm water systems that collect and treat storm water runoff.252
To protect assets in the category, DHS, in partnership with the EPA, developed
vulnerability testing for U.S. water systems and treatment facilities; has conducted threat
assessments; and developed a secure information sharing system, The Water ISAC, to
provide a forum for gathering, analyzing and sharing threat and security-related
information among Water sector components. Because the Water sector encompasses so
many assets, protection plans for this sector focus on attacks that would result in mass
casualties, significant property damage, or major economic losses. More specifically,
DHS distinguishes four concentration areas: (1) physical damage to, or destruction of,
critical assets (including the release of toxic chemicals); (2) contamination of the water
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supply; (3) cyber attack on ISAC, information management systems, or other electronic
control systems; and (4) interruption of water services.253
Critical asset protection funds for this sector are also used to enhance facility
capabilities to detect biological, chemical, or radiological contaminates in the water
supply; and to address the risk created by inextricable interdependencies between water
supply chains and other vulnerable sectors.254 For example, the U.S. water supply is
dependent upon a functioning energy sector— transporting water and wastewater requires
pumps which run on electricity – as well as a functioning transportation system to carry
chemicals required to treat water. Water supply systems also cannot function without
telecommunication systems since water and wastewater treatment facilities are largely
automated and controlled from remote locations.255 Critical asset protection funds for this
sector, therefore, are spent on hardening certain facilities, on contaminate detection
systems, and on reducing the risk of system failure due to interdependencies with other
vulnerable sectors.
The third sector is Public Health, which consists of state and local health
departments, hospitals, health clinics, nursing homes, mental health facilities, bloodsupply facilities, laboratories, mortuaries, and pharmaceutical stockpiles.256 To
understand how truly massive the Public Health sector is, consider that it includes more
than 5,800 registered hospitals.257 DHS, with HHS, works to create resiliency in this
sector since, in the event of a terrorist attack, functioning hospitals, clinics, and other
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components of the public health system are required to treat attack victims. Even if a
hospital is not the focus of a terrorist attack, if the chemical, biological, or radiological
attack contaminates the area in which a major hospital is located, the effects of that attack
could be catastrophic as there would be a debilitated capacity to treat victims.258 Critical
assets for this sector also include laboratories and facilities related to disease control and
vaccine development and storage, such as the HHS Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, and the National Strategic Stockpile.259
Hospitals, and other publically accessible facilities in this sector, are difficult to
protect because of the free-accessibility that corresponds with their function – by nature,
hospitals let anyone in their front doors. There are varying degrees of security at U.S.
hospitals; some are relatively secure while others are devoid of any security precautions
whatsoever. Another concern is the variation in structural designs of American hospitals.
Some hospitals are “immune-buildings,” meaning that the actual building is constructed
with design elements to prevent the spread of disease – such as controlled air flow
systems, isolation rooms, and surfaces that eliminate infectious agents—while other
buildings are not.260 This creates vulnerability disparities within the sector that must be
investigated using critical infrastructure funds.
Challenges with the maintenance, protection, and distribution systems for vaccine
stockpiles and other critical emergency resources are also a drain on Public Health
critical infrastructure funds.261 There are two prongs to the issue of emergency resources:
first, those resources must be maintained in a volume sufficient to address a potential
258
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terrorist attack; and second, emergency resources must be secured to avoid any potential
contamination, tampering, or inadvertent harm that would compromise resource
effectiveness.
With respect to the first prong, amassing the necessary volume of emergency
resources is encumbered by legal and tax issues. The Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act mandates that hospitals treat any patient requiring emergency care, even
if that patient does not have health insurance. In the event of a terrorist attack, hospitals
would therefore be required to treat attack victims, regardless of their insurance status.
However, once treatment is no longer classified as emergency care, the victim would be
relocated to a non-emergency care facility, which is not legally required (or allowed) to
treat patients without insurance. Thus, uninsured victims of a terrorist attack, if they did
not have sufficient private means, would be sent back to critical hospitals, thereby
overloading those facilities and compromising the ability of critical hospitals to provide
emergency care to other attack victims.262 With respect to the aforementioned tax issues,
pharmaceutical companies are taxed on their product inventory creating a disincentive for
vaccine suppliers to stockpile the amount of vaccines required to counter a major
biological attack.263 Thus, critical infrastructure funds for the Public Health sector are
used not only to protect priority facilities, like specific hospitals that have critical
capacities within their locality, but also to counter security disparities in the system and
to correct market failures that deter the accumulation of an adequate stockpile of
emergency resources.
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The fourth sector is Emergency Services, consisting of fire, rescue, emergency
medical service (EMS), and law enforcement organizations from 87,000 U.S. localities
which make up the first-line of response to any disaster or incident, both man-made and
natural.264 The 9/11 terrorist attacks exposed several weaknesses in this sector, including
inadequate information sharing between agencies, telecommunications problems, and
issues of inadequate force protection resulting from weak crime scene control and general
inability to mitigate a second attack.265 The most glaring issue, however, is the inability
of multiple first-responder units, most notably police and fire units, to coordinate
response efforts.266
Of great concern to critical infrastructure protection teams for the Emergency
Services sector is the possibility of a terrorist attack that has two phases in which the first
phase would draw first-responders to the attack scene, only to be the victims of the
second phase of the attack.267 Even if the second phase of this hypothetical attack was not
calculated, there is still the inherent risk at any terrorist attack scene that first-responders
will be contaminated by chemical, biological, or radiological agents in the atmosphere
and thus create a second wave of victims. There is also the concern that no locality has a
standing emergency response capacity to deal with the aftermath of a terrorist attack.
Though mutual aid agreements make the flow of first-responders across jurisdictions
possible, there would still likely be a shortage of first-responders in the event of another
9/11-scale terrorist attack.268 Critical Infrastructure funds for this sector go towards
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addressing this risk, along with the communication inadequacies mentioned above,
coordination of planning efforts across jurisdictions and agencies, and efforts to protect
first-responders at the scene of a terrorist attack.
The fifth sector is the Defense Industrial Base sector, for which DHS and the
Department of Defense (DOD) oversee protection planning for at least 250,000 firms in
215 distinct industries.269 The DOD relies upon private-sector contractors and industry to
manufacture the majority of military equipment, supplies, materials, services, and
weaponry used by U.S. armed forces domestically and abroad. To be efficient, DOD has
a history of competitive bidding for contracts which, as a result of market forces for these
competitive contracts, has reduced the number of redundant sources (and in some
instances has eliminated all redundant sources entirely) for important military products
and services. Redundant sources are often eliminated because U.S. military goods are
highly specified and contracted services have unique and strict requirements. In other
words, if a potential supplier of either goods or services fails to secure a military contract
in a given year, that supplier will likely cease to exist because their only possible
customer is the U.S. military. After that supplier goes out of business, the competitive bid
process becomes less competitive since the pool of potential contractors has been
diminished. This process repeats itself for several cycles until there is only one, or a few,
suppliers of a specific good or service. Once redundant sources are eliminated, there are a
relatively small number of private sector manufacturers whose individual security is
inextricably linked to U.S. military strength.
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In addition to protecting critical players in the U.S. armed forces supply chain,
Defense Industrial Base sector critical infrastructure funds also go towards instituting and
enforcing security standards for first, second, third, and fourth-tier subcontractors. DOD
relies on outsourcing for both goods and services, but the competitive bidding process for
military contracts does not take into account individual contractors’ security protocols,
and thus there are security disparities throughout the military supply chain. It is important
to discover subcontractors with inadequate security practices to be sure that the U.S.
military can operate without disruption in an emergency. To achieve this goal, Defense
Industrial Base critical infrastructure funds go toward: (1) identifying critical installations
and infrastructure; (2) creating site-specific protection plans for these designated nodes;
(3) investigating subcontractors, and the military supply chain generally, to be sure that
there are no security liabilities or unacceptable disparities; and (4) sharing information
and threat assessments with private-sector contractors and manufacturers to be sure
security corroborates with existing threats.
The sixth sector is Telecommunications. This sector is continuously evolving
because of technological advances, business and market pressures, and changes in the
regulatory environment. The telecommunications network includes both physical and
cyber infrastructure. The “backbone” of the telecommunications network is the Public
Switched Telecommunications Network (PSTN) which provides switched circuits for
telephone, data, and leased point-to-point services for public and private users. PSTN is
the largest physical infrastructure to secure, with over 20,000 switches, access tandems,
and other pieces of equipment connected by nearly two billion miles of fiber and copper
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cable. Mobile users are granted access to this wireless network via cellular, microwave,
and satellite technologies.
The Internet and private enterprise networks are also critical pieces of
infrastructure that have both a physical and cyber presence. Expansion in data network
technology has created increased demand for Internet infrastructure to provide data
services. Large Internet Service Providers (ISPs) grant access to public and private users
through Network Operation Centers (NOCs) to manage high capacity networks. Small
ISPs farm out their long-haul Internet traffic to larger ISPs and provide local Internet
service via the PSTN. Both large and small ISPs connect to the PSTN through individual
points of access—like a switch or a router—located in the main office of the specific
Internet carrier. Even international Internet traffic is vulnerable since it employs
underwater cables to transmit Internet activity to physical landing points in the United
States. Enterprise networks are specialized networks that support the voice and data
service needs of large corporation and enterprises. These networks use leased lines from
the PSTN or Internet providers. When examined, all three of these components of the
telecommunications system – the PSTN, the Internet, and enterprise networks—all
combine physical and cyber infrastructure to create risk for DHS in the event of a
terrorist attack.
The events of 9/11 demonstrated that even when they are not the predominate
target of a terrorist attack, telecommunications networks can still suffer considerable
damage, prevent first response efforts, and have lingering consequences for the U.S.
economy. To prevent human or economic loss from disruptions to the
telecommunications network, DHS uses critical infrastructure protection funds for the

92

Telecommunications sector to identify critical assets, harden those assets, and create
contingency plans in case a terrorist attack occurs. Additionally, funds are used to create
redundancies within the telecommunication network to prevent a shutdown and to create
alternative routing pathways for communications. As with other sectors,
Telecommunications is a largely private sector. This means that security costs for
individual providers may outweigh any benefit those providers gain from increased
security since the probability of being the targeted node in a Telecommunications attack
is very small. It is the federal government’s responsibility, therefore, to mandate certain
infrastructure protections, and in most cases fund those protections, since individual
vulnerabilities within the system aggregate to create an unacceptable level of risk for
homeland security.
The seventh sector is Energy which DHS, in collaboration with the Department of
Energy (DOE), divides into two segments: electricity and oil/natural gas. The electricity
industry is comprised of over 2,800 power plants serving almost 130 million households
and institutions.270 Oil and Natural gas assets consist of more than 300,000 producing
sites, 4,000 off-shore platforms, 600 natural gas processing plants, 153 refineries, 1,400
product terminals, 7,500 bulk stations, and 2 million miles of pipeline spanning the entire
United States.271
Any disruption to U.S. electricity supply chains, particularly the destruction of a
power grid, would prohibit activities that are crucial to the success of the U.S. economy
and the ability of the nation to defined itself. The North American electric system is a
multi-nodal distribution system with several interconnected nodes that supply almost all
270
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of the electricity to the United States, Canada and a significant section of Baja California
Norte, Mexico.272 The physical infrastructure of this system consists of generation,
transmission/distribution, and control communications.273 In addition to protecting
specific nodes, DHS also requires system redundancies, back-up systems, and workarounds within the system that would allow electricity providers to circumvent a
damaged portion of the system in the event of a terrorist attack.274
Other critical infrastructure expenditures for electricity systems include DHS
efforts to establish guidelines defining the necessary equipment to operate electricity
networks. Once those guidelines are established, DHS works to stockpile critical
equipment and to create restoration and recovery plans for the U.S. electric system. DHS
is also working with federal, state, and local authorities to create mutual aid plans to
prevent any one locality from being without electricity, and to implement redundancies in
the system to prevent electric failure. Finally, DHS is working with private and public
sector suppliers to establish standard risk assessment models and security protocols to
ensure that critical assets are protected and that there are no security vulnerabilities from
inadequate facility security, maintenance or personnel training.275
The second division within Energy critical infrastructure is oil and natural gas,
two largely interconnected industries. The oil infrastructure consists of five components:
oil production, crude oil transport, refining, product transport and distribution, and
control/external support systems.276 Natural gas and oil production include exploration,
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field development, on –shore and offshore production, and field collection systems.277
The transportation system for crude oil includes 160,000 miles of pipeline, storage
terminals, seaports, and container ships.278 Additionally, there are about 150 crude oil
refineries with a variety of production capabilities ranging from 5,000 to over 500,000
barrels per day.279 Finally, distribution of oil requires an extensive network of pipelines,
trains, ships, ports, terminals, storage, trucks, and retail oil stations.280
The production processes for natural gas mirrors that of the oil industry, and is
broken down into three major components: exploration/production, transmission, and
local distribution.281 Natural gas distribution in the U.S. utilizes a significant amount of
infrastructure including storage facilities, gas processing plants, liquid natural gas
facilities, and 270,000 miles of natural gas pipeline and 1,119,000 miles of natural gas
distribution lines.282 Citygates are nodes in the natural gas pipeline that connect the
greater distribution system with local distribution systems to allow efficient natural gas
distribution to a wide range of users nationwide.283
DHS and DOE critical infrastructure funds are used to create industry standards
for electricity, oil, and natural gas production and distribution systems. The purpose of
security standards is to create redundancy and resilience within each of these energy
sectors to withstand any supply disruption resulting from an act of terrorist.284 More
specifically, DHS Energy sector initiatives for critical infrastructure protection include

277

The Department of Homeland Security. The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key
Assets. 1 Mar. 2011. <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Physical_Strategy.pdf>.
278
Ibid.
279
Ibid.
280
Ibid.
281
Ibid.
282
Ibid.
283
Ibid.
284
Ibid.

95

investments in research and development to enhance industry robustness for oil and
natural gas; strategic planning efforts with state, local and private stakeholders to identify
and counteract vulnerabilities in the energy supply chain; and efforts to coordinate
equipment sharing plans to keep the supply chain functioning if a node is taken out or
debilitated by an attack.285
The eighth critical infrastructure sector is Transportation which consists of several
modes of transportation including aviation (there are over 5,000 public airports),
maritime (300 coastal/inland ports), rail (there are 120,000 miles of major railroads in the
U.S.), pipeline, highways (including 590,000 highway bridges), trucking/busing, and
mass transit (500 major urban public transit operators).286 U.S. transportation systems
pose two significant problems for DHS efforts to protect critical infrastructure: first, the
system is vast and encompasses an array of nodes, modes of transport, and locations
nationwide; and second, the system is both internally and externally interdependent.
Internal interdependencies exist because each mode of transportation is incapable of
handling the entire volume of public transportation needs, and thus requires other modes
of transportation to be viable; and external interdependencies exist because every sector
of the economy depends upon a working transportation system.
DHS aviation critical infrastructure funds are used to identify the most vulnerable
assets, including telecommunication networks and airport facilities; to identify threats to
passengers; to improve security at points of access; to improve cargo-screening
capabilities; and to research and develop new detection technologies.287 For passenger
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rail and railroad systems, DHS spends critical asset protection funds to improve shipment
practices for hazardous materials, to develop passenger baggage and intermodal container
screening capabilities, to develop a comprehensive modal risk assessment, and to create
an information sharing system for all surface transportation components to relate cyber
and physical infrastructure threats specific to railways or rail cargo.288
DHS plans to use highway, trucking, and busing critical infrastructure funds to:
(1) execute a comprehensive risk assessment for these modes of surface transportation,
(2) develop criteria for distinguishing and mitigating national and regional chokepoints,
(3) make technology investments to harden critical facilities against acts of terrorism, and
(4) create and implement a transportation operator education and awareness program for
transportation security.289 DHS critical Infrastructure protection initiatives for U.S.
pipeline include a collaborative effort with the DOE and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) to identify pipeline authorities and procedures to reconstitute
facilities after any disruption from terrorism or otherwise; as well as an effort to identify
system vulnerabilities, improve security plans, execute initiatives to deter specific threats,
upgrade response plans, and address system interdependencies.290
Maritime transportation critical infrastructure funds are used for risk assessment,
identifying best practices and vulnerabilities, developing implementation plans for new or
responsorial security measures, coordinating international cooperation, developing port
security, instituting security guidelines and security technologies for cargo and passenger
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ships, and improving waterway security.291 Mass transit critical infrastructure protection
initiatives include creating security standards, managing interdependencies with other
modes of transportation, and assessing existing impediments to enhanced security efforts,
including legal, legislative, and statutory regimes.292
The ninth sector of critical infrastructure protection is Banking and Finance, for
which DHS and the Department of the Treasury must prioritize protection for over
26,000 FDIC insured institutions.293 Physical Banking and Finance sector infrastructure
include buildings, human capital, and financial utilities, which house banking operations,
financial markets, regulatory bodies, and the repositories for documents, records and
financial assets.294 DHS and Treasury funds for critical infrastructure protection are used
to identify and combat the financial sector’s dependency on telecommunications
networks and information sharing systems, and to enhance information sharing
capabilities to allow sector components to relate and share sector-specific threat and
security information.295
The tenth sector is Chemical Industrial Hazardous Materials, which is overseen by
DHS and the EPA, and consists of 66,000 chemical plants.296 These plants produce an
array of chemical products that are essential to other sectors, most notably health care,
and which are often exported to international trading partners. Examples of goods
produced by this sector are fertilizer for agriculture, chlorine for water purification, and
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the polymers used to create plastic from petroleum.297 DHS and EPA funds for critical
infrastructure protection for this sector are used to enhance site security and security
standardization, to review legislation dictating the sale of toxic chemicals, and to
continue to develop a sector-specific information sharing system to convey security
information to component parts of this sector.298
The eleventh sector is Postal and Shipping which incorporates tens of thousands
of postal facilities, hundreds of thousands of official drop-box locations, and 137 million
delivery sites managed by more than 749,000 full-time United States Postal Service
(USPS) employees.299 USPS and DHS have identified several initiatives to be addressed
by critical infrastructure funds, including improving mail and USPS facility protection
capabilities, working to ensure the security of international mail, enhancing the USPS
security information sharing system, conducting risk assessments for important facilities,
and improving the ability of USPS to verify that the identity of the intended mail
recipient and the identity of the customer receiving the mail item match.300
In addition to the eleven major critical infrastructure sectors, there are also five
key asset classes: National Monuments and Icons (5,800 historic buildings), Nuclear
Power Plants (104 commercial nuclear power plants), Dams (80,000 dams),
Government Facilities (9,000 government owned/operated facilities protected by 1,225
full-time employees), and Commercial Assets (commercial centers, office buildings,
stadiums, theme parks, and over 460 skyscrapers).301 Components of these asset classes
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exist within the constructs of the larger 18 sectors, and therefore there is no need to
identify DHS protection initiatives for the asset classes, it is enough to note these asset
classes are distinguished as critical.
Examining the architecture of DHS critical infrastructure protection demonstrates
that there is a coherent plan prioritizing critical infrastructure by categorizing assets into
sectors with specific strategic initiatives. This indicates that critical infrastructure funds
are allocated purposefully and as a reflection of what policymakers determine to be the
most important American assets. The critique of this strategy, however, is that it is
inefficient to allocate limited security resources to harden assets and to protect
components of important industries when there are infinite potential terrorist targets.
Supporters of critical infrastructure protection cite the tremendous economic, political,
and social import of protected assets as the justification for using resources to protect
them. Supporters acknowledge that there are infinite targets, but argue that if an asset
designated as critical were to be destroyed in an attack, the consequences of that loss far
outweigh the cost of protection.
Opponents of critical infrastructure protection argue that it is legitimate to harden
a small number of invaluable targets (such as the White House), but that the majority of
critical infrastructure assets are essentially interchangeable, and for that reason, when one
asset is hardened, any terror plot against that target will adapt to focus on a different,
similar target. Thus, large-scale critical infrastructure protection is futile. Critical
infrastructure protection is an example of an aspect of the U.S. homeland security
strategy for which it is impossible to determine effectiveness—there is no way to know if
there would be more terrorist attacks if targets were more susceptible.
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There are also two negative externalities associated with critical infrastructure
protection. First, when assets are classified as critical they become subject to increased
security measures that limit public access to facilities with poignant national significance.
The second implicit cost of critical infrastructure protection is the loss of privatization
and free market forces. Several private industry sectors are designated as critical, and yet
the federal government determined that security in those sectors was inadequate, even
though there were market forces to dictate the security strategies adopted by individual
stakeholders. Government intervention in private markets weights the cost-benefit
analysis for individual stakeholders and moves the U.S. economy as a whole away from
truly free markets and towards a social system. Like reduction in access, loss of free
market principles is another implicit cost of critical infrastructure protection that is often
discounted in legislation considerations because it is unquantifiable. These two negative
externalities create cost for industry producers, and perhaps consumers as well, and thus
should be considered in policymaking decisions.

Mass Destruction: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN)
Although Chapter One details specific chemical and biological weapons, as well
as the various radiological and nuclear threats, federal programs to counter these risks fall
into the four major threat categories (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear)
without differentiating specific threats. For example, without a security clearance, there is
no way to know how much money the U.S. spends to counter the threat of a Mustard Gas
attack. This section, therefore, considers CBRN weapons programs without regard for the
proportion of funding allocated to address specific threats within those general categories.
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It is also worth noting that two previous sections of this chapter –intelligence and firstresponder programs— are directly applicable to this section. The intelligence community
helps to detect plots involving CBRN weapons, as well as discovers CBRN acquisition
attempts domestically and abroad; and first-responders will be deployed to the attack
scene in the event of a CBRN incident.
There are a number of CBRN-specific programs; these programs are some of the
most well funded security programs in the United States. Chemical and biological attack
prevention programs are grouped together in the DHS budget, while radiological and
nuclear attack prevention programs are not differentiated at all because a radiological
attack – such as a dirty bomb explosion—requires nuclear material. Thus, any program to
deter a nuclear weapons attack also deters radiological attacks.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, nuclear attack prevention programs
are facilitated by a host of Federal departments and agencies, most notably DOD, DOE,
DOS and DHS, and thus nuclear programs are funded by an amalgamation of resources
from various budgets. Federal chemical and biological security initiatives, however, are
funded exclusively by DHS. There are two sections of the DHS budget pertaining to
chemical and biological weapons programs. First, in Title III: Protection, Preparedness,
Response and Recovery, under the subheading “Office of Health and Affairs,” there are
several biological and chemical weapons-specific programs, including BioWatch, the
National Biosurveillance Integration Center, and the Rapidly Deployable Chemical
Detection System.302 And second, in Title IV: Research and Development, Training and
Services, under the subheading Science and Technology –Research, Development,
302
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Acquisition and Operations, there are two chemical and biological weapons-specific
research line items: “Chemical and Biological,” and “Laboratory Facilities.”303 When the
two chemical/biological-specific spending categories are taken together, DHS investment
to counter the threat of a chemical or biological attack in FY2007, FY2008, FY2009, and
FY2010 was $270,032,000;304 $291,479,000;305 $410,978,000;306 and $366,681,000307
respectively. When indexed for inflation, actual spending levels for the series become:
$288,965,061.7 (FY2007); $299,684,809.1 (FY2008); $422,162,072.2 (FY2009) and
$366,681,000 (FY2010).308 These figures indicate a 13.1% decrease in federal spending
from FY 2009 to FY2010, a 40.9% increase in federal spending from FY2008-FY2009,
and a 3% increase in federal spending from FY2007 to FY2008.
Though funded in consort, there are distinct programs to counter chemical versus
biological attacks. With respect to chemical attacks, there are only two realizable
scenarios: first, a terrorist organization could develop the scientific know-how to produce
a lethal chemical agent in a laboratory, and then weaponize that agent for dispersal; and
second, a terrorist organization could steal a lethal chemical agent from a laboratory
without having to learn to produce the agent independently. The first scenario does not
require (nor lend itself to) specialized programs to counter the threat of highly capable
terrorist organizations because if such organizations exist – as they do in Japan—the only
303
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effective way to detect and deter plots is to use intelligence and surveillance to monitor
the group’s activities. The second scenario is far more likely than the first, mostly
because developing chemical weapons is a sophisticated art that is unimaginable for
almost all terrorist organizations. In other words, the only plausible track to for most
terrorist groups to obtain chemical weapons is to steal them from a chemical facility, or to
co-opt an employee of a chemical facility with access to developed chemical weapons.
In response to this second scenario, the DHS created statutorily enforced
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). As of the most recent data,
collected in June of 2010, there are 4,997 facilities operating under CFATS, with facility
locations in all fifty states.309 The purpose of the CFATS initiative is to establish
minimum security levels for chemical facilities so as to prevent external infiltration from
outside actors, as well as internal resource leaks, both in terms of human capital
(knowledge) and actual chemical material. To that end, CFATS incorporates vulnerability
assessments, security plans, compliance reviews, personnel screening, and storage
protocols. As of 2010, according to DHS data, there have been over 6,000 Security
Vulnerability Assessments; over 38,000 Top-Screens; over 3,100 Site Security Plans;
over 244 Compliance Assistance Visits at chemical facilities by DHS inspectors; and
over 150 facility-specific outreach discussions.310 Chemical facilities are privately owned
and operated, which means that the most DHS can do to address the threat of chemical
terrorism is to institute security regulations and verify through inspections that facilities
meet those basic requirements.
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As for biological weapons-specific homeland security measures, DHS has two
biosurveillance systems—meaning early detection and warning systems—to counter the
bioterrorist threat. These two programs, the National Biosurveillance Integration Center
(NBIC) and BioWatch, are the only strictly biological terrorism prevention programs
within the U.S. anti-terrorism programs arsenal.311 NBIC is an information center created
by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to detect any biological events posing a national
security risk for the United States.312 The purpose of NBIC is to “rapidly identify,
characterize, localize, and track a biological event of national concern; integrate and
analyze data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring
systems; and to disseminate alerts to member agencies, and state, local, and tribal
governments.”313 NBIC is also responsible for operating the National Biosurveillance
Integration System (NBIS), created in 2004, which is an IT system used to integrate data
for surveillance of environmental, human, plant, and animal health, as well as biological
agent intelligence and threat information.314
BioWatch, created in 2003 as a system to detect the presence of airborne
biological agents, deploys detectors in 30 cities nationwide to manually collect air
samples (using stationary filters) to be analyzed for biological agents on the BioWatch
threat list. Once collected, BioWatch air samples are analyzed in state and local
laboratories, and results usually take 10 to 34 hours from the time of the dangerous
biological agents’ detection. To expedite the analysis process, DHS is working to replace
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existing detectors with Generation 3.0 detectors that would collect and simultaneously
analyze air samples; DHS began implementing this technology in 2010.
In addition to chemical and biological attacks, the U.S. homeland security strategy
also addresses the risk of a nuclear or radiological attack. Like chemical and biological
terrorism, the best strategy to counter the risk of a nuclear or radiological attack is a
robust intelligence program, and well-trained first responders to react to an attack if one
occurred in the United States. There are, however, a number of nuclear and radiological
weapons-specific programs to augment intelligence efforts.
As previously mentioned, there is no need to differentiate between nuclear and
radiological weapons prevention since deterring both radiological and nuclear terrorism
involves controlling nuclear materials. Thus, the Defense Department, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Department of Energy through the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are responsible for deterring a nuclear or
radiological attack through domestic and international initiatives to control nuclear
material and regulate nuclear facilities. Funding levels for each of these three components
will be detailed in the subsequent program descriptions, but the aggregate spending levels
(defined as the combination of total budget authority for all three) for nuclear and
radiological defense programs for FY2010, FY2009, FY2008, and FY2007, when
indexed for inflation, were: $30,040,540,000; $30,667,967,014; $22,129,504,247; and
$22,007,967,311 respectively.315 There was, therefore, a 2% funding decrease from
315
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FY2009 to FY2010, a 39% funding increase from FY2008 to FY2009, and a 0.55%
funding increase from FY2007 to FY2008.
Beginning in 1975 as a product of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, the
NRC became an independent federal agency responsible for regulating nuclear power
plants; nuclear facilities; the transportation, storage and disposal of nuclear material and
waste; and other civilian uses of nuclear products including medical programs, academic
activities, research projects, and industrial uses.316 NRC funding levels for FY2010,
FY2009, FY2008, and FY2007 were: $1,066,900,000; $1,045,500,000; $926,100,000 and
$824,900,000 respectively. When indexed for inflation, budget authority for the series
become: $1,066,900,000 (FY2010); $1,073,951,516.9 (FY2009); $952,171,860.5
(FY2008) and $882,737,017.3 (FY2007).317
To accomplish its mission, NRC establishes and enforces standards and
regulations and issues licenses to nuclear facilities and users. NRC regulations cover the
entire nuclear power production process to ensure nuclear material is handled
appropriately and that nuclear facilities meet basic security requirements. To understand
the breadth of NRC’s regulatory function, consider the complexity of the nuclear fuel
production process: first, uranium is mined and then milled uranium ore is transformed
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into “yellow cake,” a uranium concentrate.318 The yellowcake is transported and
converted into uranium hexafluoride gas and then transported to a gaseous diffusion plant
and enriched into reactor fuel.319 After uranium is fabricated into fuel pellets and loaded
into metal rods, they are bundled into reactor fuel assemblies and transported to nuclear
power plants (104 nationwide).320 The process ends when nuclear waste and byproducts
are transported from power plants and stored or disposed of.321 To control access to
nuclear material and the nuclear fuel production system, NRC has issued 3,000 licenses
for nuclear materials users (as of 2011), and conducts roughly 1,200 inspections of
license holders annually.322 There are also 37 states, operating in partnership with NRC,
with primary oversight jurisdiction over their jurisdiction’s nuclear industry and some
19,600-license holders across their respective territories.323 Thus, the primary function of
NRC is to establish and enforce regulations, in collaboration with both users and states, to
control nuclear energy production and usage in other sectors.
The DOD is involved in preventing a nuclear/radiological terrorist attack through
the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) chaired by the Secretary of
Defense. Though operated as a component of the DOD, other members of CPRC include
the DOE, DOS, DHS, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. CPRC
coordinates a multitude of counterproliferation programs for other federal agencies that
prevent the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. The diversity and volume
of programs under CPRC jurisdiction is too great to detail in this paper; there are 228
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CPRC programs, 43 of which have at least two nuclear/radiological weapons-specific
missions.324 However, examples of CPRC programs include: developing a
comprehensive strategy for the eight weapons of mass destruction mission areas (security
cooperation and partnership activities, threat reduction cooperation, consequence
management, interdiction, elimination, passive defense, active defense, and offensive
operations); organizing, training, equipping, and preparing military forces to combat
nuclear weapons delivery systems; and serving as the principle military advisor to the
President and Secretary of Defense regarding combating nuclear weapons (a function the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves).325
CPRC has significant annual budget authority to coordinate its many programs.
Funding levels for CPRC for FY2010, FY2009, FY2008, and FY2007 were:
$19,100,000,000; $22,400,000,000; $14,300,000,000 and $14,400,000,000.326 When
indexed for inflation, CPRC budget authority for the series is: $19,100,000,000
(FY2010); $23,009,578,172 (FY2009); $14,702,578,129 (FY2008) and $15,409,641,229
(FY2007).327
The final component of the U.S. anti-nuclear/radiological weapons strategy is the
NNSA, which operates under the DOE, to detect, secure and dispose of nuclear and
radiological material.328 More specifically, NNSA’s threefold mission is to “detect
nuclear and radiological materials, and WMD-related equipment; secure vulnerable
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nuclear weapons and weapons-useable nuclear and radiological materials; and dispose of
surplus weapon-useable nuclear and radiological materials.”329 Detection programs
include research and development efforts to improve nuclear detection technologies,
work with international partners to interdict nuclear and radiological weapons trafficking,
and training initiatives to educate export control and customs officials about WMDawareness.330 Initiatives to secure nuclear material and weapons include: security
programs targeting Russia and former Soviet-bloc countries that potentially hold loose
nuclear material or weapons; programs to convert research reactors to low enriched
uranium (as opposed to highly enriched uranium); and efforts to strengthen international
export regulations.331 And, finally, examples of NNSA disposal efforts include programs
to replace Russian heat and electricity generation systems so that Russia will stop
producing weapons-grade plutonium as a byproduct of antiquated Russian nuclear
reactors, and programs to dismantle and then dispose of nuclear material in excess U.S.
warheads that are being dismantled.332
To accomplish this threefold mission, NNSA has an annual budget authority of
$9,873,640,000 (FY2010);333 $6,410,000,000 (FY2009);334 $6,297,466,000 (FY2008)335
and $6,275,583,000 (FY2007).336 Once indexed for inflation, funding levels become:
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$9,873,640,000 (FY2010); $6,584,437,325 (FY2009); $6,474,754,257 (FY2008) and
$6,715,589,065 (FY2007).337
Although DHS nuclear and radiological weapons-prevention programs are
included under NNSA and CPRC jurisdiction, there is one nuclear/radiological line item
in the DHS budget that is separate from NRC, CPRC, and NNSA efforts, but which was
excluded from the aggregate nuclear/radiological funding total above. This program was
not included before because it is a research and development program that is
ambiguously defined and thus cannot be said to directly counter nuclear weapons. In Title
IV: Research and Development, Training and Services, under Science and Technology –
Research, Development, Acquisitions, and Operations there is a “Radiological and
Nuclear” subheading with a series budget authority of: $150,188,000 (FY2010);338
$161,940,000 (FY2009);339 $103,814,000 (FY2008)340 and $105,649,000 (FY2007).341
When indexed for inflation, funding levels become: $150,188,000 (FY2010);
$166,346,924 (FY2009); $106,736,605 (FY2008) and $113,056,471 (FY2007).342 These
figures indicate a 10% funding decrease from FY2009 to FY2010; a 56% funding
increase from FY2008 to FY2009; and a 6% funding decrease from FY2007 to FY2008.
This concludes the CBRN weapons-specific programs section of the costs associated with
the U.S. homeland security strategy.
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Energy Security
Energy systems security is a sector within the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP), and thus, energy security efforts were outlined briefly above in the “Critical
Infrastructure” section of this chapter. Although there is no additional energy-sector
critical infrastructure funding to report here (beyond that which was included above),
energy sector security efforts merit further inquiry since, as Chapter One indicates, a
terrorist attack targeting the U.S. energy system would be devastating. With that in mind,
this section will examine the Energy Sector security strategy as outlined by DOE in the
Energy Sector-Specific Plan (SSP), an annex to the NIPP.
The purpose of energy security efforts is to create a “robust, resilient energy
infrastructure in which continuity of business and services is maintained through secure
and reliable information sharing, effective risk management programs, coordinated
response capabilities, and trusted relationships between public and private partners at all
levels of industry and government.”343 To achieve this vision, the Energy SSP lists six
security goals: (1) establish secure, reliable, and timely information sharing systems; (2)
enhance physical and cyber security measures based on sound risk assessment; (3)
conduct comprehensive disaster, emergency, and continuity planning to prepare
emergency response units; (4) define critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for
public, private, state, local, and tribal partners; (5) understand and address energy
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interdependencies; and (6) strengthen public confidence in the Energy Sector’s resiliency
and emergency/disaster preparedness.344
To be clear, the Energy Sector includes three major resource classes: electricity,
petroleum, and natural gas; and each of these classes has its own set of infrastructure and
activities to protect. To demonstrate the security challenge posed by the sheer size of the
Energy Sector, consider the processing cycle for each of these three fuel sources. Before
electricity can be used as a household fuel source, it must be generated (using fossil fuels
like coal, natural gas or oil, or by using nuclear, hydroelectric, or renewable energy
sources), it is then transported and distributed using substations, lines, and controls
centers.345 Before petroleum can be used as fuel, it must be mined as crude in onshore or
offshore fields, held briefly in terminals from which it is transported using pipelines to
processing facilities to be refined and transported, again using pipelines, to storage
facilities, control systems, and petroleum market operators.346 Finally, before natural gas
is used as fuel, it must be mined from onshore or offshore fields, processed and then
transported and distributed using pipelines to storage and liquid natural gas facilities,
from which it can be transported, again using pipelines, to control systems and natural
gas market operators.347
There are over 120 programs operated by private and public organizations to
address the six Energy Sector goals mentioned above. These programs fall into one of
four categories: information sharing and communications, physical and cyber security,
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coordination and planning, and public confidence programs.348 Enumerating all Energy
Sector security programs extends beyond the scope and purpose of this paper. It is useful,
however, to mention the major programs that exist to counter the threat of Energy Sector
terrorism.
Most information sharing and communication programs strive to facilitate
security information exchange by creating a “national web-based platform to share
homeland security information with sector partners.” Examples include public systems,
like DHS-IP HSIN, as well as private sector systems like the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation’s (NERC) ESISAC system. NERC is a not-for-profit,
independent organization responsible for ensuring the reliability of the bulk power
system in North America.349 To do that, NERC operates the ESISAC system. ESISAC
“receives incident data from private and public entities; assists DOE, FERC, and DHS in
analyzing event data to determine threat vulnerabilities and trends; facilitates analysis of
incident data and prepares information; disseminates threat alerts, warnings, advisories,
notices, and vulnerability assessments;” serves as a liaison between private and public
government infrastructure information-sharing centers; and creates awareness about
private and public government infrastructure interdependencies.350 This system
exemplifies the public-private Energy Sector relationship, in which there is no distinction
made at times between governmental and independent players, as evidenced by this
privately owned and operated information sharing network to which the government is a
348
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party. Private industry groups for both oil and natural gas are working to establish a
similar information sharing system.
Physical and cyber security programs “analyze current security risks and provide
information to support effective risk reduction decisions,” and to “provide funding for
programs that reduce losses from future disasters or help prevent catastrophes.”351 Public
confidence programs recognize APPA (American Public Power Association) member
utilities that meet stringent guidelines and levels of attainment in the areas of reliability,
safety, cybersecurity, mutual aid, disaster management, R&D, and system
improvement.”352 Even though this examination of the Energy SSP does not actually
include new budget authority to report above the figures reported in the Critical
Infrastructure section of this chapter, the threat of energy-sector attacks posed in Chapter
One would not be addressed fully without considering these program initiatives.

Cybersecurity
Chapter One identifies several possible attack scenarios, including those involving
a breach of U.S. cybersecurity to attack energy systems. Given the documented ability of
terrorists and rival nation-state’s to infiltrate U.S. information and communication
systems, cybersecurity has ascended to a position of high priority for security officials. In
May 2009, President Obama issued “The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative” as a roadmap of current and future cybersecurity initiatives whose purpose is
to: ensure a coordinated response to future cyber attacks; strengthen the partnerships
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between private and public-sector cybersecurity actors; invest in new technology and
research and development to ensure that the U.S. is on the cutting-edge of cybersecurity;
and promote cyber awareness and cyber education to build the next generation of
technology-savvy cybersecurity operatives.353
Although President Obama’s cybersecurity outline is helpful to consider as a
snapshot of existing and future programs, it is DHS that funds cybersecurity initiatives.
There are two sections within the DHS budget dedicated to cybersecurity funding: first,
under Title I: Department Management and Operations, Office of the Chief Information
Officer, “Infrastructure and Security Activities;” and second, under Title III: Protection,
Preparedness, Response and Recovery, National Protection and Programs Directorate,
“National Cyber Security Division.”354 When resources available in these two funding
sections are combined, total funding levels for FY2010-FY2007 are: $398,720,000
(FY2010);355 $345,086,000 (FY2009);356 $328,796,000 (FY2008);357 and $288,156,000
(FY2007).358 When indexed for inflation, funding levels for the series become:
$398,720,000 (FY2010); $354,476,933 (FY2009); $338,052,369 (FY2008); and
$308,359,762 (FY2007).359 These figures show a 12.5% cybersecurity funding increase
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from FY2009 to FY2010; a 5% cybersecurity funding increase from FY2008 to FY2009;
and a 10% cybersecurity funding increase from FY2007 to FY2008.
President Obama’s “Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative” outlines
twelve cybersecurity initiatives to be carried out by private and public-sector
cybersecurity operatives, but mostly by, or under the supervision of, DHS. The first
initiative is to consolidate federal government access points through the Trusted Internet
Connections (TIC) initiative, headed by DHS, to reduce the number of external access
points, establish baseline security capabilities, and allow DHS to verify agency adherence
to baseline security capabilities and standards.360
The second initiative is to deploy Intrusion Detection Systems with sensors to
detect when unauthorized users are attempting to access federal information sharing
networks.361 DHS currently uses the EINSTEIN 2 capability to monitor Internet activity
entering federal systems; EINSTEIN 2 can detect potentially malicious Internet activity
with “signature-based sensors.”362 Similarly, the third initiative is to pursue the
deployment of EINSTEIN 3 which would prevent intrusions before they occur through
real-time monitoring of network traffic entering or leaving Executive Branch networks.363
The fourth initiative is to coordinate cybersecurity research and development
efforts since “no single individual or organization is aware of all of the cyber-related
R&D activities being funded by the Government.”364 This lack of oversight and
coordination creates the possibility of wasteful spending and research redundancies. The
360
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fifth initiative is to connect cybersecurity offices and strategic operation centers to
enhance information sharing capabilities; ideally this coordination will occur under DHS’
National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC) which already exists to secure and facilitate
cybersecurity information sharing.365
The sixth initiative is to develop a government-wide cyber counterintelligence
(CI) plan; this initiative will be addressed by realigning priorities within the intelligence
community.366 The seventh initiative is to increase classified network security, and the
eighth initiative is to expand cyber education to create the next generation of cyber
security operatives.367
The ninth initiative is to develop “leap-ahead” technology, strategies, and
programs; these are high-risk/high-payoff research projects.368 The tenth initiative is to
develop enduring deterrence strategies by “improving warning capabilities, articulating
roles for private and international partners, and developing appropriate responses for both
state and non-state actors.”369 The eleventh initiative is develop a risk-management
strategy for global supply chains of commercial information and communications
technology that covers the entire lifecycle of products vulnerable for infiltration (such as
computer component parts, etc.) that could result in unauthorized access or interruption
of communications.370 Finally, the twelfth initiative is to define the federal role for
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incorporating cybersecurity into the DHS-sponsored critical infrastructure protection
plans with private and public-sector stakeholders.371
Cybersecurity is clearly a growing sector of homeland security, but not without at
least two major negative externalities. First, with added cybersecurity efforts, there is
growing concern about protecting civil liberties and the right to privacy. The
Government’s monitoring of civilian Internet activity is a direct cost for Americans’
privacy and civil liberties, and as such, it should be taken into account when considering
the cost of cybersecurity. Second, the Government’s regulation of the product lifecycle
of communications technology, meaning the supply chain, creates a burden for private
sector suppliers of communications technology; as well as for communications systems
service providers.372 Security increases as liberty decreases—this is the established
relationship between liberty and security in any sector; cybersecurity is no exception.

The Coast Guard, Border/Customs Programs, and Concluding Remarks
The purpose of Chapter Two is to take the threats outlined in Chapter One and to
examine: (1) what federal programs exist to address each threat, and (2) how much
money the United States spends on those programs (and thus, how much the U.S. spends
to address each threat listed in Chapter One). Now that the applicable federal programs
have been identified, and costs enumerated, there are still two unaddressed DHS program
areas to discuss: The Coast Guard, and Border/Customs programs. Although they may
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address terrorism tangentially, terrorism is not the main focus of the Coast Guard or
Border/Customs programs. Thus, because counterterrorism is not the proximate cause for
either program area, it would be inappropriate to categorize federal funding for these
programs as counterterrorism spending. However, this is a point of some contention,
since both the Coast Guard and U.S. border security programs are funded by DHS. To be
transparent, therefore, it is worth noting that FY2010 funding for Coast Guard programs
was $10,140,291,000,373 and FY2010 funding for all Border/Customs programs was
$12,478,791,000.374 Should the reader find it appropriate to include either of these
funding areas in homeland security funding, she may add those funding totals to
aggregate funding levels provided in Chapter Three. This concludes the “cost” section of
the U.S. homeland security strategy risk-cost-benefit analysis underway.
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Chapter Three: Benefit
The first two chapters of this thesis outline the terrorism risk to U.S. homeland
security and the cost of U.S. anti-terrorism operations. Chapter Three focuses on the
“benefits” of homeland security spending by considering the ratio of risk to cost for
certain security sectors. In essence, Chapter Three is the “benefit” section of this riskcost-benefit analysis for U.S. anti-terrorism expenditures.
The primary “benefit” of any security measure is to decrease national
susceptibility to terrorism by strengthening anti-terrorism deterrence, prevention and
preparedness programs. There are two factors that make it difficult to distinguish
program-specific benefits for U.S. anti-terrorism efforts: first, homeland security
initiatives do not exist in isolation; all of the programs outlined in Chapter Two operate
simultaneously, and thus it is impossible to consider the benefit derived from any one
security measure. And second, there is no clear metric, besides instances of terrorism in
the United States, to determine which security programs are successful, and which
programs are underperforming or are disproportionate to the applicable risk. Notice, both
of these factors are true only for citizens and policymakers without access to the internal
operations of anti-terrorism programs. Presumably, officials involved in executing
security programs can gauge the success of their program based on the appropriate
standard with respect to their program-specific anti-terrorism mission (e.g. number of
terror plots foiled, terrorist detained, etc.).
The success or failure of terrorism is dependent upon an array of situational
factors, some of which are controlled by terrorists, others of which are controlled by the
target country, and others still which are entirely random (such as the weather for a
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bioterrorist attack). Despite the multiplicity of factors dictating the success or failure of
terrorism, U.S. homeland security officials tout the success of increased security efforts
based on the fact that there has not been another large-scale terrorist attack since 9/11.
While it is psychologically soothing to attribute the absence of large-scale terrorism to
U.S. homeland security measures, there is no way to confirm or deny the inverse
relationship between security efforts and large-scale terrorism. Without a metric to gauge
the success of individual security measures, policymakers never demonstrate the value of
threat-specific security programs to the uninformed general public. This means that the
electorate can neither verify nor disprove the necessity of security efforts at current
funding levels. For the ordinary citizen or policymaker, then, it is impossible to judge the
marginal gain, or the benefit, to U.S. homeland security of specific programs.
Thus, the concept of “benefit,” with respect to U.S. homeland security programs,
must be redefined. Instead of thinking about benefit as an increase in security, this paper
will consider benefit as addressing the known risk of terrorism, and to the appropriate
degree (meaning the degree to which threat-specific security programs are in proportion
to the security risks they address). Chapter Three, therefore, will use the threat analysis of
Chapter One (risk), in light of the data outlined in Chapter Two (cost), to determine
whether several existing U.S. homeland security sectors have a positive, negative, or
neutral benefit for national security.
To address the threats outlined in Chapter One, Chapter Two identifies eight
security sectors: Intelligence, First-Responders, Secret Service, Transportation Security,
Critical Infrastructure Protection, Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, Nuclear
and Radiological Weapons Programs, and Cybersecurity Programs. Funding levels for
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these security sectors for FY2010 were: $53,100,000,000 (Intelligence); $12,178,670,000
(First-Responders); $522,113,000 (First-Responders Emergency Communications
Systems); $2,957,338,000 (Secret Service); $7,656,066,000 (Transportation Systems);
$2,058,993,000 (Critical Infrastructure); $366,681,000 (Chemical and Biological
Weapons Programs); $30,040,540,000 (General Nuclear and Radiological Weapons
Programs) plus $150,188,000 (DHS Nuclear and Radiological Weapons Programs); and
$398,720,000 (Cybersecurity Programs).375 When funding levels for each of these
programs are consolidated, the total U.S. homeland security budget for FY2010 was
$109,429,309,000. It is important to note that this figure includes programs with multiple
missions, but for which the primary mission is counterterrorism. Thus, this figure may
include some funding that is not actually used for counterterrorism, but it is impossible to
distinguish those funds from aggregate expenditures.
Using $109,429,309,000 as the total budget authority for all domestic antiterrorism programs, it is then possible to determine what percentage of total funding was
allotted to each security sector, and thus to establish the priority afforded to each sector.
For all security appropriations for FY2010, Intelligence Programs received 48%, Nuclear
and Radiological Programs received 28% (when general program funding and DHS
program funding is combined), First-Responder Programs received 11.1%,
Transportation Security Programs received 7%, The Secret Service received 2.7%,
Critical Infrastructure Programs received 2%, Emergency Communications Systems
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Programs received 0.5%, Cybersecurity Programs received 0.36%, and Chemical and
Biological Weapons Programs received 0.34%.
Rank

Security Sector

1

Intelligence

Percentage of Total
FY2010 Security Funds
48%

2

Nuclear/Radiological

28%

3

First-Responders

11.1%

4

Transportation Security

7%

5

Secret Service

2.7%

6

Critical Infrastructure

2%

7

0.5%

8

Emergency
Communications
Systems
Cybersecurity Programs

0.36%

9

Chemical/Biological

0.34%

There are four points to make about the homeland security spending distribution
for FY2010. First, intelligence spending represents nearly half (48%) of all security
funding. While $53.1 billion appears to be an inappropriately large sum to spend on nonmilitary intelligence, it may actually be an efficient use of federal funds. Second, nuclear
and radiological weapons programs receive the second largest portion of federal funding
(28%); this does not correlate with the threat posed by atomic terrorism. Although some
nuclear and radiological weapons programs serve non-counterterrorism missions, total
funding for these programs is so large that, even if a significant portion went towards
traditional purposes, there would still be a disproportionately large sum dedicated to
nuclear anti-terrorism programs. Furthermore, even though certain nuclear weapons
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programs serve non-counterterrorism missions those programs may nevertheless
contribute to anti-terrorism efforts. With any nonproliferation program, there is no clear
distinction between traditional safety missions and anti-terrorism missions since general
nuclear security also contributes to atomic terrorism prevention. Thus, this paper
acknowledges that nuclear programs entail non-counterterrorism initiatives, but
nevertheless uses total nuclear funding since it is unclear exactly which initiatives should
be classified as anti-terrorism measures versus traditional nonproliferation measures.
Third, bioterrorism prevention programs, which receive only 0.34% of all federal
security dollars, are inadequate. Though bioterrorism is not the most pressing security
risk, the lack of U.S. preparedness for this mode of terrorism creates unnecessary risk and
thus bioterrorism prevention should be more of a national security priority. And finally,
cyberterrorism is a rapidly emerging and significant threat, and yet it receives only 0.36%
of federal homeland security funds. Cyberterrorism must become more of a security
priority since the risk of cyber attack increases with the passage of time. With both
bioterrorism prevention and cybersecurity, it is unclear whether additional homeland
security funds would result in increased national security. Experts point to obvious holes
in both bioterrorism prevention and cybersecurity systems, but increasing biosecurity
and cybersecurity budgets may be unnecessary and, without access to operational
information, it would be groundless to prescribe funding increases here. Thus, this paper
merely identifies the security vulnerabilities in these areas and recommends addressing
the risk created by flawed security systems. The remainder of this chapter will focus on
these four points and will conclude with a brief analysis of U.S. anti-terrorism funding
levels in FY2010 relative to other U.S. budget priorities and national wealth.
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As noted above, non-military intelligence spending for FY2010 was $53.1 billion,
which represents 48% of all U.S. homeland security funding. Intelligence is the largest
recipient of federal security funds for two reasons: first, intelligence programs are
responsible for providing information services to a large number of agencies with
missions beyond counterterrorism; and second, because policymakers understand that
“good intelligence is the best weapon against international terrorism.”376 The single most
effective way to prevent terrorism is to ascertain accurate information about the identity,
plans, goals, and vulnerabilities of terrorists and terrorist organizations.377 This is because
there are an infinite number of possible targets and means for terrorism, and thus
protecting infrastructure is far less effective than preempting attacks by gathering timely
and accurate information.
Intelligence programs are obviously necessary, but it is impossible for an
individual without a security clearance to determine whether U.S. intelligence
expenditures are efficient. This is because intelligence spending, beyond aggregate
spending totals, is classified. There are numerous reports expressing the need for more
human intelligence sources to counter terrorism. One Congressional Research Service
report notes that counterterrorism is “especially dependent” on human intelligence
sources and “depends on contacts with sources far removed from embassy gatherings and
requires expertise in languages that are possessed by few in this country.”378 Without
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knowing how much money is already spent on gathering human intelligence, or on
linguists, it is impossible to gauge the necessity or efficiency of current spending levels.
There are two additional facets of U.S. intelligence programs that make it difficult
to determine whether intelligence funds are well spent. First, intelligence operations are
classified, and thus, there is no way to determine whether intelligence programs reflect
genuine risk. For example, the general public cannot look up how many terrorist plots are
discovered annually; there is only anecdotal evidence in the media from which to
approximate the number of CIA and FBI interventions. Thus, for the general public, there
is no way to distinguish good intelligence investments from bad intelligence investments.
This is problematic because it is impossible to check federal policymakers without the
relevant information. The democratic system breaks down when the electorate does not
have access to the necessary information to form an opinion of security spending, and
thus congressional representatives act illegitimately.
The second factor that complicates an analysis of the value of intelligence
spending is the civil liberty cost associated with intelligence gathering. To allow
information to flow more freely between the FBI and the CIA, Congress passed the
PATRIOT Act in 2001. The purpose of the PATRIOT Act was to implement an “allservice intelligence effort against terrorist groups inside and outside the U.S.;” but the de
facto result was an invasion of privacy for U.S. citizens. There is, then, a cost for U.S.
intelligence programs paid by the sacrifice of individual civil liberties. As noted in
Chapter Two, negative externalities, like reduced civil liberties, are not true “costs”
because they cannot be quantified. Nonetheless, negative externalities are real in that
their presence has a palpable and detrimental impact much like quantifiable cost. Yet,
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without knowing the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence programs, it is impossible for
Americans to determine whether the price of intelligence (meaning reduced civil
liberties) is justified by an equal increase in security.
Thus, all that may be said with certainty about the amount of money the United
States spends on non-military intelligence programs is that, in general, experts agree that
intelligence is the best way to counter terrorism, and that there have been complaints
about inadequate human intelligence for anti-terrorism programs. There is very little that
can be said, however, about the value of intelligence programs based on their success in
discovering terrorists; and there is even less that can be said about the value of
intelligence programs that directly violate civil liberties, since nothing is known about the
productiveness of those programs. This lack of transparency would be more acceptable if
there was a smaller amount of money involved, but because intelligence programs are the
highest funded sector of U.S. homeland security, there must be an effort to disclose more
information to the general public about how intelligence funding is spent to justify the
financial and social costs for this security sector.
Nuclear nonproliferation and defense programs are the second highest funded
security sector, receiving 28% of all security appropriations. Judging the efficiency of
atomic terrorism prevention programs is complicated by the fact that the risk of a nuclear
attack is miniscule, and yet the catastrophic consequences of such an attack make even a
small risk of nuclear proliferation unacceptable. The devastation of a nuclear attack
would be profound, both economically and politically, but current spending levels for
nuclear prevention programs are disproportionately high relative to all but the most
extreme scenarios (which are essentially impossible). This is because the possible paths
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for terrorist groups to acquire or create nuclear weapons are riddled with serious
obstacles, and when considered together, the accumulation of these obstacles renders
them likely insurmountable.
The best way to conceptualize how truly small the probability is of atomic
terrorism is to review the steps necessary to acquire or create a nuclear weapon. There are
only three routes to atomic terrorism. A terrorist organization could: (1) acquire a
completed nuclear weapon from a nuclear state; (2) steal or illicitly purchase a nuclear
weapon; or (3) build its own nuclear weapon.379 The first path, acquiring a nuclear
weapon from a sympathetic nuclear state, is often discussed with respect to Pakistan and
North Korea. This scenario is unlikely, however, because with the advent of nuclear
forensics (which allows investigators to connect the nuclear material used in an atomic
weapon to its source) the origin of the nuclear material used by terrorists would be
discovered, and the wrath of the international community would be swift and exacting. In
short, any nuclear state willing to provide terrorists with an atomic weapon might as well
detonate that weapon directly since the result is the same.
Some issue experts are concerned about the possibility of private nuclear weapons
contracting by technocrats willing to sell their expertise to terrorist organizations. For
example, Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan is known to have sold his nuclear weapons
expertise to both North Korea and Iran.380 This is a distorted conception of that threat,
however, since even the opportunistic Khan never aided terrorists; he only took nation
states as clients, and his operation was easily discovered and shutdown by U.S.
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intelligence services.381 This distinction is important since, unlike terrorists, nation states
desire nuclear weapons to create prestige or leverage within the international community;
most nuclear states do not actually intend to detonate their nuclear devices. There may be
an exception to this general rule, such as a truly belligerent state like Libya today, but the
United States has successfully countered the threat of state-sponsored atomic terrorism in
the past (e.g. the Cold War). Atomic terrorism by non-state actors, however, is an entirely
different threat since the United States’ ability to counter atomic terrorism by non-state
actors is markedly different, and arguably more complicated, than the United States’
ability to prevent state-sponsored atomic terrorism.
The second path to atomic terrorism is for a terrorist group to steal or illicitly buy
a nuclear weapon. Experts devised two possible scenarios for stealing a nuclear weapon:
first, terrorists could steal a “loose nuke” allegedly in circulation in former Soviet bloc
nations; and second, a terrorist group could infiltrate the nuclear facilities of a state and
steal a nuclear weapon or the nuclear material for a weapon.382 The first scenario is
highly contentious since Russian nuclear officials and Russian nuclear program experts
vehemently deny that Al Qaeda or any terrorist organization could have acquired Russian
atomic weapons.383 The same experts also point out that, even if a terrorist organization
did have a loose Russian nuke, all of the Soviet nuclear weapons were constructed before
1991, and since nuclear weapons are very difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one
to three years, no Soviet loose nukes would be viable today.384 Also, Russia has a vested
interest in securing any loose nukes, as Russia is the likely target of atomic terrorism if
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loose nukes were acquired by Chechen terrorists. For these reasons the fabled Soviet
loose nuke threat seems to be more myth than fact.
Some experts also worry that a nuclear state will fail, such as North Korea or
Pakistan, and then that nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists. This
scenario is also unlikely because, were a nuclear state to fail, the international community
would move quickly to secure nuclear material. Additionally, for a terrorist organization
to take advantage of a failing state, they would have to strike at precisely the right
moment, work in perfect harmony to transport the weapon without discovery, and find a
covert storage facility to avoid international detection.
It is also possible that a terrorist organization could steal a nuclear weapon or
nuclear material from a stable nuclear state. This scenario is unrealistic since nuclear
facilities are well protected, and because even if infiltrated, nuclear states would
immediately notice the missing material and would work to recover the nuclear material.
There is every reason to believe that the violated nuclear state would launch an
immediate and feverish investigation for the same reasons that a nuclear state does not
give terrorists nuclear materials: because nuclear material is easily traceable, and the
nuclear state would not want to be held responsible for a nuclear incident originating
from their nuclear material.385
The third, and most likely, path to atomic terrorism is for a terrorist organization
to construct a nuclear weapon. This scenario is the most likely scenario because of the
issues associated with receiving, stealing, or illicitly buying a nuclear weapon outlined
above. Plutonium and uranium are the two options for obtaining the fissile material
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needed to construct a nuclear weapon. Because of the dangers of working with and
transporting plutonium, terrorists would almost certainly choose to work with highly
enriched uranium (HEU).386
To construct a weapon, terrorists would have to collect as much HEU as possible,
and then use that material to build a nuclear device. Because of the complexity of
transporting the nuclear device from the production site to the target site, the nuclear
device would probably not be sophisticated enough to be able to be dropped or launched,
but rather would be a simple design that could be detonated by suicide terrorists at the
target site.387 Even this, the simplest scenario, requires terrorist organizations to
overcome significant obstacles at every stage of production.
To illuminate just how difficult constructing a nuclear weapon is, consider the
process terrorists would have to undergo to accomplish a rudimentary atomic weapon.
First, fissile material can be either produced or procured. Terrorists would not be able to
produce HEU since to do so would require an industrial scale effort that would be
impossible to conceal, if it were even possible for a terrorist group to orchestrate.388 As
with nuclear weapons, states are unlikely to give terrorists fissile material since it can be
traced back to the state; thus, terrorists would have to steal or illicitly purchase HEU.389
It is very unlikely that terrorists would be able to steal HEU because fissile
material is kept under tight surveillance and thus authorities monitoring fissile material
would realize if HEU were missing. In fact, “known thefts of highly enriched uranium
have totaled fewer than 16 pounds or so. That amount is far less than that required for an
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atomic explosion for a crude bomb, over 100 pounds are necessary to produce a yield of
one kiloton.”390 Furthermore, of the known thefts, none were committed by AQ, none of
the thieves had buyers lined up before the robbery operation, and almost all of the thieves
were caught when they tried to sell the stolen HEU.391
For the purpose of demonstrating the inherent obstacles facing would-be atomic
terrorists, assume terrorists succeeded in acquiring enough HEU for an atomic weapon,
either through theft or illicit transactions. They would then have to transport their
contraband back to their base of operations to construct a weapon. Given the amount of
HEU required to make a nuclear device, the HEU would probably be coming from
multiple locations, which creates tremendous risk that, at some point in the transportation
process, some of the HEU will be detected by customs or border security.392
Again for the sake of the argument, assume also that terrorists find a means to
evade border security, and transport all of the necessary HEU back to their base of
operations, there is still the issue of actually constructing the nuclear devise. To make an
atomic weapon, terrorists would have to set up a large, technically advanced facility, and
populate it with skilled technicians, scientists and mechanics.393 If the facility was not
detected by citizens, local security authorities, or international security agencies, then the
terrorists would also need detailed instructions to build a nuclear bomb (a very dangerous
task), as well as, a constant supply of electricity and reliable access to tools and
supplies.394 If these conditions could be achieved, terrorists would also need months, if
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not a year or more, to construct the weapon, during which time the operation would have
to avoid detection.
If a terrorist organization were to produce a nuclear weapon, they would still need
to transport that weapon to the target site. This would be challenging since any nuclear
devise would have to be concealed in lead shielding to hide radioactive emissions, which
would mean that the weapon would weigh a ton or more.395 Terrorists would have two
options for transporting the atomic bomb. First, they could use the commercial
transportation system, which would essentially supply authorities with a return address
for the weapon, and hope transportation authorities do not detect the nuclear weapon.396
Or, alternatively, they could hire an aircraft or use established smuggling routes which
would require the absolute reliability and loyalty of a cadre of accomplices.397 If the
nuclear devise were to be successfully transported, it would then have to be received by
technically skilled terrorists capable of maintaining the devise and transporting it, using
public roads, to the target site without detection.398
In addition to these obstacles, there is also the financial burden of producing a
nuclear weapon to consider. Creating or buying a weapon involves significant
investments in materials, human capital, and in transportation and concealment costs.
Terrorists with the amount of money necessary must also be willing to expend that
amount of money on an attack plan with a very low probability of success. To quantify
just how low the chance is of executing a successful atomic attack, CATO Institute
nuclear terrorism expert, John Mueller, identifies 20 obstacles standing between willing
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terrorists and an atomic weapon, all of which are mentioned above. Next, Mueller gives
terrorists a very generous 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles. Given
those odds, there is a 1-in-1,048,576 chance of success for terrorists.399 Mueller
recognizes that a 50% chance of overcoming each obstacle is unrealistic, so to better
reflect reality, Mueller runs a second model in which he gives terrorists a one-in-three
chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles. Given those odds, there is a 1-in3,486,784,401 chance that terrorists will successfully execute a nuclear attack.400
This analysis is not meant as an argument against all nuclear weapons prevention
programs; rather, it is meant to contextualize nuclear spending. Any nuclear event would
have catastrophic consequences—there is literally no greater risk to the United States in
terms of potential financial and human losses. However, the risk of such an attack is
miniscule. Thus, policymakers must address the threat, but not give into alarmist
scenarios that inflate the risk of atomic terrorism to justify spending 28% of all security
funds on nuclear prevention. Again, some nuclear prevention programs serve broader
security purposes than strictly counterterrorism, but that does not justify current spending
levels. Nuclear terrorism is a threat worth preventing, but the response to this threat
cannot be hugely disproportionate to risk, especially when U.S. security funds are limited
and greater threats to U.S. homeland security exist that are not given adequate resources.
Bioterrorism is one such example of a financially underrepresented risk to U.S.
homeland security. In FY2010, bioterrorism was allocated just 0.34% of all federal
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security funds, or $366,681,000.401 In 2005, Interpol, the leading international security
agency, hosted a bioterrorism conference in France to galvanize attending nations to
develop bioterrorism prevention programs. At that conference, Ronald K. Noble, the
Secretary General of Interpol, said: “Heads of government, the United Nations, the World
Health Organization, heads of police intelligence services, counter-terrorism experts and
we at Interpol all agree that the threat of bioterrorism is real and present.”402 In fact,
Noble went so far as to describe the threat of a bioterrorist attack as the greatest
“potential danger to all countries, regions and people.”403 AQ has indicated that the
group intends to use biological agents in a massive terrorism event, and even posted
instructions to create a biological weapon online.
The threat of bioterrorism is not the most pressing concern for the United States
because biological agents are difficult to weaponize, and thus other, cruder weapons like
IEDs are more likely to be used in terrorist attacks. That said, bioterrorism is a genuine
threat, as indicated by Interpol, and the United States is unprepared to counter it. In recent
years, there has been an effort to improve the U.S. bioterrorism prevention strategy by
implementing widespread biosurveillance. There are two purposes of biosurveillance:
first, to detect a potentially dangerous biological event as soon as possible; and second, to
improve the quality of information available about a biological incident to increase
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situational awareness and to guide the national response to such a biological event.404
Even though biosurveillance is the largest aspect of the U.S. anti-bioterrorism strategy,
implementation of this tool has been retarded by a lack of centralized leadership and
funding. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) describes the current status of
the U.S. anti-bioterrorism strategy as incomplete: “While national defense strategies have
been developed to address biological threats such as pandemic influenza, there is neither
a comprehensive national strategy nor a focal point with the authority and resources to
guide the effort to develop a national biosurveillance capability.”405
To sufficiently address the threat of bioterrorism, the U.S. must develop a strong,
integrated biosurveillance capability. Without access to operational information, all that
is known about current bioterrorism prevention efforts is that the United States has
insufficient biosurveillance capabilities. What is unclear, however, is whether additional
resources would help expedite the biosurveillance implementation process. Components
of the biosurveillance implementation process point to the lack of centralized leadership
to disseminate responsibilities and to oversee the implementation of a biosurveillance
system as the reason for inadequate biosureveillance, but additional funding will not fix
this organizational problem. There may also be a need for additional resources, but
enlarging the bioterrorism budget should happen only after organizational problems are
addressed. Going forward, Congress should condition bioterrorism prevention funds upon
the reorganization of DHS efforts to implement biosurveillance capabilities. Congress
should also identify leadership and agency responsibilities and institute deadlines for
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biosurveillance implementation. Bioterrorism is a complex mode of terrorism, and it is
unlikely that the United States will be the victim of a large-scale biological terrorist
attack. But as the anthrax mailings of 2001 demonstrate, bioterrorism is possible, and the
United States’ current inability to counter this risk creates unnecessary and unacceptable
vulnerability.
Cyberterrorism continues to emerge as a threat to U.S. homeland security, and
like bioterrorism, it is a vulnerable security sector. The most significant cybersecurity risk
is the infiltration of federal information sharing systems; particularly since government
systems are increasingly interconnected.406 This threat is not only realizable, but it is also
gaining momentum: from FY2006 to FY2009, cybersecurity incidents increased by over
400-percent.407 The GAO has made several recommendations to strengthen national
cybersecurity including fully-implementing the Federal Desktop Core Configuration
Initiative; requiring delinquent agencies to execute their agreements with DHS to use the
Einstein computer network detection system; and requiring delinquent agencies to meet
the requirements for the Trusted Internet Connections Initiative.408
The most common recommendation, however, is to fully-implement the twentyfour policy improvements outlined in 2009 by the commission appointed by President
Obama to investigate Bush-era cybersecurity programs. In 2008, the Bush Administration
created the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) to improve
cybersecurity within government information sharing systems. Then, in 2009, President
Obama ordered a review of the national cybersecurity strategy, with emphasis on
406
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government systems. That review yielded twenty-four policy recommendations to
improve national cybersecurity. Of those twenty-four recommendations, only two have
been fully implemented.409
The GAO investigated implementation efforts for these twenty-four initiatives to
determine why the implementation process was moving so slowly. The investigation
revealed that the agencies responsible for implementation –primarily DHS, DOD, and
OMB—were struggling to progress because they have not been assigned roles or
responsibilities for implementing the broad, long-term recommendations.410 Investigators
also found that sixteen of the twenty-two partially implemented recommendations do not
even have identifiable milestones or defined plans for implantation.411
GAO investigators concluded that, until there are assigned roles and
responsibilities for all agencies involved, as well as milestones and clear implementation
plans, “there is increased risk the recommendations will not be successfully completed,
which would place the country’s cyber infrastructure at risk.”412 Cybersecurity may well
be the Achilles’ heel of the U.S. homeland security strategy—especially since experts
agree that, as terrorist organizations gain computing sophistication, the threat of cyber
attack will only increase with time. As noted in Chapter Two, many assets listed as
critical infrastructure require information sharing system, and are interconnected through
common computer networks. This means that vulnerabilities to cyber infrastructure
would have particularly dire consequences for the energy sector, intelligence programs,
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emergency responders, and a host of other agencies. For this reason, it is imperative that
U.S. policymakers make cybersecurity more of a priority and oversee the implementation
of all policy recommendations. Unlike bioterrorism, where vulnerability may simply be
the product of mismanagement, cybersecurity is weak and will require robust tools to
secure government networks. This may require more than the current spending level of
$398,720,000, or 0.36% of total federal security dollars; and it certainly requires full
participation from implicated government agencies and additional leadership with the
authority to force agency compliance to cybersecurity protocols.
Comparing U.S. security spending levels in a vacuum is useful insofar as it
demonstrates national security priorities; but it conveys very little about the
appropriateness of aggregate U.S. anti-terrorism spending. This is because the
appropriateness of anti-terrorism expenditures is relative not only to risk, but also to total
federal expenditures and to national wealth. The purpose of considering total federal
expenditures is twofold: first, it provides a scale for security funding. There is no way to
judge the reasonableness of security funding without knowing the total amount of money
the United States spends annually. For example, $109,429,309,000 (total U.S. security
spending) could be an enormous amount of money or it could be a miniscule amount
depending on how much money is spent on all other programs. Second, considering total
federal expenditures allows the observer to determine federal funding priorities and thus
to contextualize security funding relative to other sectors. It is important to understand
security funding relative to other sectors because security funding levels are appropriate
if, and only if, they are proportional to the funding levels of other federally funded
sectors of the economy. For example, $109,429,309,000 is not an appropriate amount of
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money to spend on anti-terrorism programs if total U.S. healthcare expenditures are less
than that amount. Finally, it is important to consider security funding relative to national
wealth (measured in gross domestic product for this paper) because the appropriateness
of U.S. anti-terrorism expenditures depends on total national wealth. If, for example,
annual security funding amounts to more than the annual gross domestic product (GDP),
then security programs receive an inappropriately large amount of money. The following
analysis, then, considers FY2010 security funding relative to (1) total federal
expenditures for FY2010, and (2) GDP for 2010.
Total federal expenditure for FY2010 was $3.456 trillion.413 Most of the federal
budget is consumed by four sectors: Defense, Healthcare, Pensions and Welfare. In
FY2010, Defense programs received $847.2 billion or 25% of all federal outlays.414
Healthcare received $820.7 billion in FY2010, or 24% of all federal outlays.415 In
FY2010, Pensions received $749.6 billion or 22% of total federal expenditures for that
year.416 And finally, Welfare received $502.3 billion in federal funding or 15% of all
FY2010 federal expenditures.417 The rest of the federal budget for FY2010 was
consumed by Interest on public debt ($196.2 billion), Protection ($53.4 billion),
Transportation ($92 billion), General Government ($24.7 billion), and Other Spending
($29.7 billion).418 In FY2010, the United States spent $109,429,309,000 on anti-terrorism
measures; this represents 3.17% of all budget outlays for that year. The conclusion to
draw here is that, on the continuum of federally funded sectors, homeland security
413
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programs fall in between the major and the minor components of the budget: antiterrorism funding is less than Defense, Healthcare, Pensions and Welfare, but greater
than Transportation, General Government, and Other Spending. Without regard for the
quantity allocated, this is an appropriate place for anti-terrorism measures to fall.
Homeland security should be a national priority, but it is not the supreme priority.
Similarly, GDP for 2010 was $14.66 trillion.419 Thus, in 2010, federal
expenditures as a percentage of GDP were as follows: Defense, 5.78% of GDP;
Healthcare, 5.6% of GDP; Pensions, 5.1% of GDP; and Welfare, 3.4% of GDP. For 2010,
anti-terrorism programs represented 0.746% of GDP; this is even less than the interest
owed on public debt in 2010, which represented 1.34% of GDP. France, and other
European nations designate 1% of GDP to be the appropriate amount to spend on antiterrorism efforts.420 Current U.S. homeland security expenditures are slightly less than
1% of GDP, but are close enough to that target to be considered an appropriate
percentage of total national wealth, as defined by the European model.
There are two additional points to make here: first, U.S. anti-terrorism measures
are not a significant federal investment relative to the four largest consumers of federal
funds (Defense, Healthcare, Pensions, and Welfare). This is appropriate, however,
because anti-terrorism programs do not have the same manifest benefit and necessity as
these other four sectors. Homeland security measures counter unknown, emerging, and
unlikely threats; thus, the benefit and necessity of security programs are debatable.
Defense, Healthcare, Pension and Welfare programs, however, serve at least large
419

Chantrill, Christopher. "FY2010 Government Spending Details ." U.S. Government Spending. Web. 10
Apr. 2011. <http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/piechart_2010_US_fed>.
420
Archick, Kristin, et al. European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.
Congressional Research Service, 24 July 2006. Web. 30 Mar. 2011.
<http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/RL33573.pdf>.

142

segments of the population – if not the entire population (as with Defense programs).
Thus, it is reasonable to make anti-terrorism programs less of a national priority than
Defense, Healthcare, Pensions, and Welfare since, unlike these other sectors, the
marginal benefit and necessity of anti-terrorism programs is ambiguous.
The second point to make is that with federal expenditure, comes federal deficit
and public debt. The federal deficit for FY2010 was $1.3 trillion and the gross public
debt in FY2010 was $13.5 trillion.421 Deficit and debt considerations compound the
problem of how to prioritize anti-terrorism spending. Now, instead of a merit-based
question (i.e., should the United States fund anti-terrorism efforts at current levels?), the
growing federal deficit and debt change the consideration to an ethics-based question
(i.e., can the United States afford to fund anti-terrorism efforts at current levels?). Going
forward, policymakers will likely have to cut spending to make U.S. debt sustainable.
The important thing to note from this comparison of anti-terrorism measures relative to
total expenditure and GDP is that it is appropriate for anti-terrorism measures fall below
the largest sectors of the economy, but above lesser priority sectors. Thus, in the event of
a major budget recalibration, the current budget prioritization should remain; there should
be across-the-board cuts to all sectors, including homeland security.

Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the accuracy of the risk assessment
model used by U.S. policymakers to allocate homeland security funds. Unfortunately,
any risk-cost-benefit analysis for U.S. homeland security is clouded by the fact that,
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without a security clearance, there is no ability to discern how certain security sectors
spend federal funds. This analysis is also encumbered by the fact that, even when funding
levels are not classified, spending reports are not centralized in one location. To get a
snap shot of homeland security spending, the observer must piece together spending
information from a host of various agency websites, from appropriation bills, from
governmental and non-governmental think-tank studies, and from analyses by
government watch-dog organizations. This lack of transparency is understandable to a
degree, since terrorists also look to define U.S. homeland security expenditures, but there
must be more of an effort to inform the American electorate about security programs
when divulging operational and funding information does not endanger national security.
Despite roadblocks created by the sensitive nature of security spending, it is
possible to point to four issues that deter accurate risk assessment for U.S. policymakers
allocating security funds. First, preventing atomic terrorism involves countering a threat
with a very low probability but very large consequences, and “the tendency has been to
overestimate both probability and consequences.”422 Second, terrorists put considerable
time and effort into planning attacks for which the United States is unprepared; thus, any
effort to predict risk based on previously observed threats is inherently outdated.423 Some
threats persist, such as suicide bombers, but target selection, modes of terrorism, and
even terrorist groups continually evolve to encompass knew, unknown scenarios making
risk assessment essentially a moving target. Third, homeland security risk assessments
seem to discount the economic effects of security programs. Some pervasive security
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measures inhibit commerce, require private markets to meet governmental standards that
are not economically efficient, and increase the cost of doing business in the United
States; while other programs are stimulatory, adding to domestic prosperity by creating
jobs for a technically skilled labor force.424 Fourth, the politicization of homeland
security appropriations allows fear mongering and pork barreling to eclipse actual risk,
leading to distorted national security priorities. Because it is impossible to predict future
terrorist attacks, it is easy for alarmists to inflate the perceived risk of low-probability
threats. This, in turn, allows Congress to spend heavily to prevent unlikely threats while
accumulating goodwill from those positively affected by increased security spending.
Normally, wasteful spending is checked by reports of inefficient expenditures, but
“because the threats [the U.S. is] defending against are so improbable, we have little
ability to measure the benefit of a program other than by how much is spent on it. We can
spend large sums of money without substantially reducing the risk of an attack.”425
The United States historically equates increased expenditure with increased
security, which is perhaps why the U.S. spends “more than most other nations combined
to prepare for attacks.”426 In fact, some critics of current security spending levels claim
that terrorism preparation has become a means of federal subsidy, removed entirely from
genuine risk assessment models.427 These critics point to the federal grant funding
received by “the Amish Country Popcorn Company” in Indiana, which has a population
of 4,200; and to the fact that Florida’s “City of Mermaids” was designated as critical
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infrastructure; and to a state agency in Kentucky that was awarded grant funding to
“prevent terrorists from using bingo games to fund their operations.”428 These examples
are obviously egregious outliers, but they nonetheless demonstrate the point that, instead
of reflecting the intelligence community’s assessment of realistic national security
concerns, grant funding can become a means of earmark spending.
Without access to intelligence data, there is no way of knowing how many plots
the U.S. disrupts annually, nor if terrorist plots are actively deterred by homeland security
measures. It is possible, however, to point to the failed terrorist attacks occurring from
2009-2010 as evidence that America is clearly not as safe as security budgets indicate.
This risk-cost-benefit analysis determined that intelligence spending is markedly greater
than any other security sector, and that very little publicly available information exists
about how intelligence funds are spent; that nuclear prevention programs are over-funded
relative to the actual risk of an atomic terrorist event; that biological terrorism, though
perhaps not as likely as other modes of terrorism, is underfunded; and that cybersecurity
is underfunded given the emerging, unaddressed nature of that threat. The remaining
question, then, is what improvements can be made to adjust the federal homeland security
risk-cost-benefit analysis.
There are several policy considerations that, if implemented, would improve the
accuracy of homeland security risk assessment and the efficiency of security
appropriations. First, with respect to terrorist target selection, policy makers must be
aware that there are an infinite number of potential terrorist targets. Admittedly, some
targets are more appealing based on their national importance, but those targets have been
428
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hardened by increased security measures, and thus are less likely to be the target of a
successful terrorist attack. Once the most obvious targets, like the Pentagon, are
discounted, other targets are essentially random. Terrorists select their targets based on
convenience or because they have knowledge of the specific layout or intricacies of their
target. The large amount of federal funding dedicated to “protective measures” indicates
that policymakers have not internalized the fact that possible terrorist targets are infinite.
Protective measures are passive defense efforts, such as “posting security guards,
hardening targets against explosions, screening people entering an area, setting up
barriers, and installing security cameras.”429 These efforts might be useful in preventing
pedestrian crime, but they represent only marginal gains in homeland security.
Target selection has historically been even more random for homegrown
terrorism. Former Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, warns that homegrown terrorists
are the most likely perpetrators of future acts of terrorism; given the access and proximity
advantages they hold living in the United States.430 Mueller also notes that domestic
terrorists choose targets “for their convenience.”431 Instances of homegrown terrorism,
whether successful or not, involve targets familiar to the terrorists. This creates an
element of randomness that disallows the prediction of future targets, and thus forecloses
the opportunity to harden likely targets through increased security measures. International
terrorists may focus on iconic targets, perhaps because they are unfamiliar with noniconic U.S. assets, but as indicated by trends established over the last few years, incidents
of domestic terrorism are more likely to be successful than international terrorist plots.
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Policymakers, therefore, must shift focus from hardening a long list of critical
assets to a more pragmatic approach that recognizes the inherent randomness of any
domestic terrorist attack. For example, policymakers could reallocate federal funds to
strengthen telecommunications systems that are used by every major component of the
U.S. energy industry, instead of hardening individual nodes within the system.
Additionally, policymakers could spend more on first-responders for vulnerable areas, as
opposed to hardening bridges, buildings, and other lower-profile potential targets.
Essentially, these examples demonstrate a shift away from preventing individual attack
scenarios towards strengthening broader vulnerabilities (like cyber and communication
network) and towards creating robust response capabilities.
Likewise, policymakers must understand that threat displacement occurs; i.e.,
when one target is hardened, terrorists can easily change targets. Thus, there is no
automatic net gain to national security from strengthening security measures at individual
nodes; this is true even for some assets designated as critical infrastructure. There may be
a benefit from strengthening nodes if those nodes are of particular national significance,
but for generic valuable assets, the net gain is negligible. The law of threat displacement
indicates that hardening one target can make another target effectively less safe. For
example, if a terrorist discovers that Seattle’s Space Needle has been hardened by DHS
grant funding, then that terrorist will not endanger the success of her attack by pursuing
the Space Needle as her target; she will change targets. This means that increased
security for one asset makes other potential targets actually less safe. To be clear, “less
safe” refers to the fact that other Seattle assets, to continue the example, are now more
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likely to be chosen as the target of a terrorist attack than they were before the Space
Needle was hardened.
Threat displacement, however, is not an argument in favor of doing nothing.
Regardless of what actions are taken to protect the Space Needle, the baseline threat is
unchanged: a terrorist plans to attack Seattle. The significance of threat displacement,
therefore, is not that hardening one target increases risk, but rather that hardening a target
does not eliminate risk, and may not even reduce risk. Hardening targets merely transfers
risk. Once policymakers understand threat displacement, they must then utilize a kind of
security calculus to determine whether there is a net gain from displacing risk from one
target to others. To return to an earlier example, policymakers may decide that the Space
Needle has significant national importance (economically, politically, or in terms of
morale), and that for that reason, there is value in displacing the risk of a terrorist event
targeting the Space Needle to other assets in Seattle.
This first phase of the necessary mental calculus is straightforward; all that must
be determined is if there is extraordinary inherent value associated with specific targets.
The value of a target is determined not only by its national significance, but also based on
the potential loss of life and economic impact if the target were attacked. The second
phase of security calculus is more complex. Once policymakers identify a target as worth
protecting, they must make an effort to quantify the value of protecting that target. How
much should the United States be willing to pay to prevent the Space Needle from being
attacked? This is a difficult exercise since most of the benefits derived from safeguarding
specific assets are intangible. In other words, how do you quantify the value of the Statue
of Liberty? The Statue of Liberty has some economic value as a tourist attraction, but the
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indisputable value of that asset stems from its poignancy as a national icon, and from the
adverse effect on national morale any attack on the Statue of Liberty would have. While
quantifying value is difficult, it must be addressed, since there has to be a ceiling for the
inherent value of national icons to guide federal spending for protective measures.
Similarly, policymakers must also distinguish two other types of targets when
allocating funds for protective measures. First, there are a number of targets considered
vulnerable, in that they are easy to attack, but yet are not vulnerable in that they are easy
to replace if attacked.432 There are implicit consequences for terrorist attacks, such as the
shock to the national collective psyche, but beyond these unquantifiable consequences,
many pieces of critical infrastructure cost more to protect than they would cost to rebuild.
The second type of targets that policymakers must differentiate are targets for
which adequate protection would mean shutting down the asset entirely.433 For example,
public transportation systems are risk-laden modes of transportation since they are, by
definition, easily accessible and open to the public without mechanisms to prevent access
by potentially dangerous individuals. There is no way to remove the risk of terrorism for
public transportation systems without fundamentally changing the purpose and nature of
public transportation. Enacting the necessary security measures, such as screening all
passengers before they enter the public transportation vehicle, is untenable since enacting
them would require either unsustainably high federal investments, or a massive increase
in the price of using public transportation. The first option is not possible given the finite
nature of security funds, and the second option is not possible because it would ruin
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public transportation whose consumer base opts to use a less convenient mode of
transportation, relative to personal car ownership, because of the financial gains mass
transit offers. Thus, there is no way to secure mass transit without crippling the system.
This is just one example of the sort of industry policymakers must recognize as having
inextricable security limitations.
In short, this thesis does not necessarily advocate less spending, so much as it
advocates a more nuanced approach to spending that limits worst-case scenario thinking
and focuses on realistic prevention and creating resiliency. The first consequence of this
modality of thinking about security spending is to avoid addressing unrealistic threats.
Atomic terrorism, if successful, would be horrific. However, the likelihood of a terrorist
organization obtaining a nuclear weapon, yet alone transporting it and detonating it
successfully, is severely limited. American security expenditures should reflect this
limitation, not the worst-case scenario. A more nuanced approach to security spending
would also attempt to incorporate the negative externalities detailed in Chapter Two.
Several security sectors, such as intelligence, have significant negative externalities.
These costs, such as curtailed civil liberties, are not quantifiable but that does not mean
that they can be ethically discounted in security calculations.
Additionally, policymakers must understand that there is a double-cost (or a
double-benefit) for many security measures. The first cost is the initial cost to the
American taxpayer for whatever security programs are allocated from federal funds; and
the second cost stems from the economic costs of security measures to businesses and
individual consumers. More specifically, security measures increase cost to private
business, thus increasing the market price for commerce for that industry. This increase is
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either absorbed by the corporation as a loss, or is passed on to consumers by way of price
increases. Alternatively, there may be a double-benefit from security measures. The first
benefit is an increase in personal and national security from a specific anti-terrorism
measure, and the second benefit is the stimulatory effect of security measures on certain
segments of the economy. Whether there is a double-cost or a double-benefit, federal
measures have a direct effect on private business and individual consumers that is often
excluded from policymakers’ decision to legislate security regulations. These costs are
often discounted or underestimated because the economic effects of legislation are felt
much later as an echo of regulation.
Instead of a straight cost-benefit analysis, homeland security expenditures should
be subject to a systematic, dynamic scoring process that takes into account risk, cost,
possible positive and negative externalities, other federal budget priorities, and the
marginal gain from each security initiative. This scoring process would evaluate risk by
giving each risk sector a score based on the likelihood and potential consequences of an
attack. Then security efforts in each risk sector would be scored based on positive and
negative externalities and on marginal program benefit (how efficiently and effectively
does the program address risk?) Then federal funds would be allocated based on each
programs’ score. This scoring mechanism would standardize the appropriations process
for homeland security to avoid wasteful spending. It is also important to appropriate
homeland security funds systematically because of the lack of transparency in this sector.
Taxpayers do not have access to operational information about security programs and,
thus, a standard appropriations process based on rational, dispassionate methods would at
least assure taxpayers that their tax dollars are being allocated reasonably.
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The original purpose of this paper was to conduct a crude risk-cost-benefit
analysis in an attempt to determine if the U.S. homeland security strategy was successful
(defined as efficiently addressing risk). In pursuit of that objective, however, this thesis
has also taken on a second, and perhaps more important purpose: to determine what
information about risk, cost, and benefit is available to the average American. Risk is
well documented; a large body of work defining the threat of terrorism for the United
States is available from a host of sources and issue experts. Cost is piecemeal, but mostly
discernable for the tenacious inquirer, assuming that she is willing to troll various Internet
sources to form an amalgamation of funding data. But there is simply no way to
appreciate the benefit of U.S. homeland security measures without intelligence
information. Moreover, there is no way to know what else would be done with the federal
funds saved if homeland security funding was reduced. There is also no non-arbitrary
way to deal with certain social costs (like reduced civil liberties) from increase security,
and there is also no way to know the extent of the economic effects (both positive and
negative) of security efforts. Thus, the role for economic analysis in anti-terrorism
appropriations is limited.
With respect to the second purpose of this thesis— discovering what information
is publically available and the quality of that information— all that can be determined
definitively from public information is that the U.S. homeland security strategy places
intelligence as the highest priority, probably over-protects against the low-probability
threat of atomic terrorism, is vulnerable to cyberterrorism and bioterrorism, and lacks
transparency with respect to program-specific costs and benefits. Interestingly, the
process of conducting a risk-cost-benefit analysis revealed little about the success of the
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U.S. homeland security strategy, but revealed a great deal about the lack of transparency
for U.S. anti-terrorism measures. There are only two ways to improve homeland security
transparency: (1) make public the operational information for anti-terrorism programs so
that the effectiveness of security efforts is determinable; or (2) establish a metric for
scoring security programs (like the process detailed above) so that there is a metric to
determine the value of each security program and of security spending generally. The
former option is unrealistic because declassifying operational information could
jeopardize anti-terrorism efforts and endanger national security. Thus, installing a metric
to gauge the effectiveness of security spending is the necessary compromise to inform
Americans about anti-terrorism efforts without compromising homeland security. Once
value is determinable, taxpayers can finally make normative judgments about the success
of the U.S. homeland security strategy.
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